Deductibility of Reserves for Workers\u27 Compensation Losses by Self-Insured Employers by Malone, Raymond M.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 1
1981
Deductibility of Reserves for Workers'
Compensation Losses by Self-Insured Employers
Raymond M. Malone
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Raymond M. Malone, Deductibility of Reserves for Workers' Compensation Losses by Self-Insured Employers, 32 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187
(1981)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol32/iss1/12
Notes
DEDUCTIBILITY OF RESERVES FOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LOSSES BY SELF-
INSURED EMPLOYERS
Employers who self-insure workers' compensation risks typically for financial
reporting purposes, establish reserves for anticipated expenses of such losses by
charges against current income. The deductibility of these se/f-insurance reservesfor
federal income taxpurposes is thefocus of this Note. The authorflrst examines the
background, nature, and regulation of workers' compensation, Financial reporting
requirements then are contrasted with tax accounting concepts regarding treatment
of the reserves. Finally, the analysis concludes that self-insurance reseres should be
deductibleforfederal income taxpurposes when the objectives of tax accounting are
not frustrated
INTRODUCTION
MANY EMPLOYERS utilize self-insurance or a large risk re-
tention to fund the ever increasing expenses' of liability for
employment-related injury and disease. The heightened financial
responsibility placed on employers by increasingly strict state
workers' compensation statutes and its attendant insurance costs
forces employers to retain the risk, or a great portion thereof, of
insuring their employees.'
Sound accounting practice requires that employers who self-
insure these workers' compensation risks establish an allowance or
"reserve" for anticipated expenses of workers' compensation
1. See generally Treischmann & Levereth, Answering the Question: To Self-Insure or
Not to Self-Insure Workers' Comp Costs?, 27 RISK MGMT. 39 (1980). "In 1973, workers'
compensation accounted for 11.9 percent of total property-liability premiums, according to
Bests'Repiew, Property Casualty Insurance Edition, June 1979. Since 1973, workers' com-
pensation's relative share of all property-liability insurance premiums has increased. In
1978, premiums were over 12 billion dollars, and workers' compensation accounted for 15
percent of property-liability premiums." Id. An examination of the increased burden of
workers' compensation as a percentage of payroll reveals that the cost was $0.89 per $100
of payroll in 1959. This amount increased to $0.96 in 1962 and $1.12 in 1975. By 1977,
cost in terms of aggregate payrolls rose to $1.71 per $100 of payroll. This 1977 figure repre-
sents a 92.1% increase since 1959. Id.
2. A survey of Fortune's top 500 industrial corporations indicates that five out of six
companies were self-insuring some portion of their corporate risk and most expected their
percentage of self-risk assumption to increase. Fortune Market Research, How Major In-
dustrial Corporations View Property/Liability Insurance, FORTUNE MARKET RESEARCH 21-
23 (Oct. 1973).
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losses growing out of current operations.3 Such a reserve is typi-
cally established by charges against current income when manage-
ment is reasonably certain that expenditures will be required that
are not currently payable obligations and the amounts of these
obligations can be fixed with precision or are reasonably estima-
ble.4 The federal income tax implications regarding these reserves
become significant. The tax issue is that while payments to insur-
ers for workers' compensation insurance premiums are fully de-
ductible for federal income tax purposes regardless of employer
losses,5 reserves for contingent or accruable losses of self-insuring
employers presumably do not become deductible until after the
losses are payable,6 despite their deductibility as they accrue for
financial reporting purposes.7 This disparity between the treat-
ment of self-insurance reserves for financial reporting and federal
income tax purposes is the focus of this Note.
The Note first explores the background, nature, and regulation
of workers' compensation' and then assesses self-insurance as a
mechanism for handling risks of loss due to employment-related
injury and disease.9 Additionally, financial reporting require-
ments are related to the self-insurance transaction and contrasted
with the tax accounting concepts of this transaction."t The vari-
ous rationales underlying the current Internal Revenue Service
(the Service) position on the issue of "reserves" in general are ana-
3. Although proper accounting terminology refers to these charges as "allowances,"
for purposes of this Note and for federal income tax purposes, all such provisions are re-
ferred to as "reserves."
4. Reserves also are employed as a valuation account measuring the decrease in
value of an asset or balance sheet item. Examples of valuation account reserves are al-
lowances for depreciation on buildings or equipment or a reserve for bad debts on receiv-
ables. I.R.C. §§ 167 and 166, respectively, specifically authorize these reserves as
deductible expenses. A reserve also is employed as an appropriation of retained earnings.
This appropriation is usually in accordance with legal or contractual requirements, such as
a covenant requiring a bond sinking fund or the board of directors' authorization. Exam-
ples of the latter are appropriations for general loss contingencies, plant expansion, or pos-
sible inventory decline. This latter type of appropriation reserve generally does not involve
allowable deductions. Appropriations for general loss contingencies do not satisfy the
I.R.C. § 162 test of being an ascertainable, definite, and fixed liability to be deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. H. SIMONS, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING
572-73 (6th ed. 1978).
5. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 63-69.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 34-62.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 20-33.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 55-62.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 33-54.
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lyzed and then applied to self-insurance reserves."' The Note con-
cludes that reserves for self-insurance should be deductible for
federal income tax purposes in situations where the objectives of
tax accounting are not frustrated. Such treatment conforms with
financial reporting requirements and results in consistency
between financial and tax accounting methods.
I. W6RKERS' COMPENSATION
Both individuals and business enterprises are exposed to risks.
A business enterprise, however, faces purely financial risk or ex-
posure from employment-related disease and injury of employ-
ees.' 2 It is essential that employers cope with these risks in the
most financially expedient manner. That task is called "risk man-
agement."' 3 Risk management is complicated by pervasive state
regulation of workers' compensation liability and financial report-
ing requirements imposed by independent accountants and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. 4
A. The Concepts of Risk Management and Risk Retention
Risk management is essentially a threefold process: discover-
ing the sources from which losses may arise; evaluating the impact
of a possible loss on an organization; and selecting the most effec-
tive and efficient techniques to accommodate that risk.'5 Among
the techniques for managing risk and reducing the uncertainty of
11. See infra text accompanying notes 80-227.
12. Risk is generally defined as "uncertainty of loss." Classifying the risk is essential
in determining methods of risk management. Although financial risks may be classified in
several ways, two divisions are particularly useful for purposes of this Note: (I) the distinc-
tion between speculative and pure risks, and (2) the separation of fundamental and particu-
lar risks. Speculative risks provide the chance of gain or loss. Pure risks are taken with the
prospect of only loss or no loss; there is no chafice of profit or gain. Workers' compensa-
tion losses are pure risks. Fundamental risks arise from losses that are impersonal both in
origin and consequence. The losses are not caused by individual action but generally origi-
nate in the economic, political, or social interdependency of society. Classic examples in-
dude war, inflation, unemployment, fads or changing customs, and obsolescence.
Industrial accidents are an inevitable consequence of the industrial system. The rationale
for workers' compensation is that the cost of this fundamental risk should be borne by the
creators and beneficiaries of the industrial system. Particular risks arise from losses that
originate in individual events; the impact is felt in localized consequences. These risks are
essentially personal both in cause and in effect. See general, H. DENENBERO, R. EILERS,
G. HOFFMAN, C. KLINE, J. MELONE & H. SNIDER, RISK AND INSURANCE 4-7 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as RISK AND INSURANCE].
13. See infra text accompanying notes 15-19.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 20-62.
15. See RISK AND INSURANCE, supra note 12, at 67-68.
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financial loss is risk retention by the enterprise. Risk retention
consists of an integrated plan for internalizing costs associated
with enterprise property or casualty losses. Through the plan, the
enterprise makes provisions to bear the burden of the loss
internally. 1
6
Risk retention has become a popular technique of risk man-
agement because of corporate growth in terms of financial capac-
ity to bear losses, the increasing cost of insurance-the traditional
form of loss exposure protection" 7-and the increasing complexity
of enterprise liability in dollar amount and types of liability expo-
sure. The primary rationale justifying risk retention is that the
costs of alternative methods of treatment may be greater than
their value to the risk bearer. The risk also may be of such little
significance that its adverse effects can be accepted readily when
considered in conjunction with the amount and likelihood of loss,
stability of cash flow, and composition of the firm's assets and lia-
bilities.18 Some risks, however, may not be susceptible to any-
thing but risk retention treatment. Lack of an insurance market
for the particular risk of the enterprise or the enterprise's past loss
experience may prevent it from obtaining insurance. 9 Thus, em-
ployers seeking to accommodate workers' compensation risks in
the most effective and efficient manner must internalize the costs
of the risk of such losses. Pervasive state regulations regarding
adequacy of funding for these risks complicate the enterprise's
choice of risk retention and formulation of a risk retention plan.
B. Regulation of Workers' Compensation
Forty-seven states currently provide for compulsory coverage
under workers' compensation laws20 and nearly all employers in
16. Risk retention, a situation in which a plan or program has been established to
meet the adverse financial results of a loss, but where no transfer of risk to another party is
involved, is only one of four techniques of risk management. Others are: (1) increased
knowledge of the risk bearer regarding existence of certain risks and methods of safeguard-
ing against them; (2) prevention of loss and reduction of loss severity through precaution-
ary measures; and (3) risk transfer through the mechanism of insurance for pure risks and
through hedging or diversification for speculative risks. Id. at 8-10.
17. The traditional form of reduction of uncertainty of loss from risk was thought to
be risk reduction through transfer and combination. I. PFEFFER, INSURANCE AND Eco-
NOMIC THEORY 53-54 (1956).
18. See RISK AND INSURANCE, supra note 12, at 77-80.
19. Id.
20. Coverage is still elective in three states: South Carolina, New Jersey, and Texas.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION LAWS 3-4 (1981).
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the United States are subject to some form of workers' compensa-
tion law.21 State regulation of employer liability began around
1900 when negligence was used to determine liability for indus-
trial accident costs. The applicable negligence rules were con-
trolled by both state statute and common law. From 1911 to 1949,
virtually all states adopted a shared strict liability system known
as "workmen's compensation. ' 22 Under this system, an employer
is obligated to pay employees a legislatively predetermined
amount to compensate for employment-related injury or death,
regardless of the cause of the accident.23 The policy objectives of
this system are prompt compensation of employees and reduction
of litigation. Liability for an accident is imposed on the employer
by operation of law once the employee shows that the accident or
disease arose out of the course and scope of employment. Such
statutes also fix amounts paid for wage replacement, medical re-
imbursement, death benefits, and permanent total disability com-
pensation. 24 The only issues which may be litigated are whether
the accident or disease arose in the course of employment and the
existence and extent of disability.
25
21. In 1977, 87.8% of all wage and salary employees were covered by workers' com-
pensation laws. These figures represent an increase of 3.5% or 2.5 million more employees
over 1976. Covered payrolls amounted to approximately $824 billion or 85.9% of total
civilian wage and salary disbursements. Id. at viii.
22. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: 4 Comparison of Negligence and Strict
Liability Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 298 (1976). For a comparison of negligence and
strict liability systems, see Epstein, 4 Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); Posner,.A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
23. Chelius, supra note 22, at 300.
24. The types of benefits fixed by law which the employer must pay are: (I) cash
benefits for physical impairment and replacement for loss of income and earning capacity;
(2) survivor benefits for fatal injuries; and (3) medical benefits for reimbursement of em-
ployee's medical expenses. The cash benefits for physical impairment and wage loss for
permanent and total disability are fixed by a formula expressed as a percentage of wages.
For temporary total disability, the same wage-replacement percentage as for permanent
total disability is paid, but the dollar amount and the length of time benefits may be re-
ceived are limited. For temporary partial disability, benefits are fixed by a formula based
on lost wages or a percentage of total disability benefits. Benefits for permanent partial
disability such as the loss of, or the loss of the use of, specific body members are considered
scheduled injuries. Compensation for these injuries is established by law and subject to a
maximum amount. Survivor benefits for fatal injuries are computed using a percentage of
wages for a time period determined by existence of a spouse, number and ages of children,
and a burial allowance. Medical benefits or medical expense reimbursement generally must
be paid without limit as to time or amount. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS 14-23 (1980).
25. Where an injury is caused by a third party's negligence, some states award the
employee a cause of action against the negligent party. Since this award creates the possi-
bility of the employee receiving both a workers' compensation and a tort-based recovery,
some state statutes provide a safeguard against such a double recovery. See, eg., N.Y.
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With a few exceptions, no federal laws directly control the ad-
ministration or benefit levels of workers' compenstion claims
among private, state, and municipal employers.26 The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 27 however, has in-
creased and standardized workers' compensation benefits. The
Act created a National Commission on State Workmen's Com-
pensation laws to determine whether state workers' compensation
laws provided adequate, prompt, and equitable compensation for
employment-related injury or death. The commission reported
that state workers' compensation laws "in general are inadequate
and inequitable. '2  The report, which made eighty-four recom-
mendations, nineteen of which were declared essential,2 9 resulted
in several unsuccessful attempts to enact a uniform federal work-
WORK. COMP. LAW § 29 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1981-1982). This safeguard is accom-
plished by reimbursing the employer from the proceeds of a third party recovery. Schreier,
No Fault and Its Relationshp to Workmen's Compensation-The Lien Problem, 50 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 7 (1978).
26. Federal employees are covered under a workers' compensation statute similar to
state statutes. The Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of benefit computation and claims procedure under this
Act, see Airolu, Federal Compensation Procedures Today, 10 FORUM 193 (1974).
A few statutes, though limited in scope, cover employees of private employers: (1) Fed-
eral Employers, Liability Act §§ 1, 2 (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976); (2) Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) §§ 1-22, 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979); and (3) Jones Act, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (1920) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 46 U.S.C.). The FELA essentially covers railroad employees injured within the
scope of employment. See Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R., 351 U.S. 502 (1956). The LHWCA
covers any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any har-
bor workers, including a shipbuilder and shipbreaker, for disability or death resulting from
an injury occurring on navigable waters of the United States. See Stocker, An Overview of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 12 FORUM 674 (1977). The
Jones Act is designed to benefit employees on a vessel who aid in the vessel's navigation.
27. Pub. Law. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15,
18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
28. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 119
(1972). "Adequate" is defined in this report as "delivering sufficient benefits and services
to meet the objectives of the program." "Equitable" is defined as "delivering benefits and
services fairly as judged by the program's consistency in providing equal benefits or serv-
ices to workers in identical circumstances . I... Id. at 137.
29. These essential recommendations can be classified in the following seven
broad categories:
1) All workmen's compensation laws should be compulsory.
2) Occupational and numerical exemptions to coverage should be abolished.
3) Occupational diseases should be fully-covered [sic] whenever work-related.
4) Medical and physical rehabilitation services should be unlimited as regards
duration and monetary expense.
5) Claimants should be permitted a choice of location for filing claims when-
ever engaged in employment having multi-state contacts.
6) Weekly cash benefits in case of death, temporary, or permanent total disa-
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ers' compensation statute.3" OSHA's impact on private employ-
ers, however, is evidenced by approximately 100 amendments to
state workers' compensation laws in 1976 and the drafting of 300
new laws in 1977.3  Benefit amounts have doubled since 1972,
and most benefit levels are tied to annual increases in national or
state average weekly wages.32
Prompted by such federal action, states have sought vigorously
to increase benefits and broaden the scope of employer liability
under workers' compensation. Correspondingly, a dramatic in-
crease in enterprise expenses has resulted, illustrating the urgent
need for an efficient and effective plan for handling the increased
risks of loss due to employment-related injury and disease. In ad-
dition to the increased liability resulting from recent legislation,
employers are constrained further by consideration of proper
financial accounting tieatment of workers' compensation
transactions.
C. Financial Reporting Requirementsfor Workers' Compensation
Losses
Proper financial reporting requires that workers' compensation
losses be accounted for in accordance with Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) Statement No. 5.33 The statement pro-
vides that an estimated loss from a lbss contingency 34 shall be ac-
bility, should be two-thirds of the worker's gross weekly wage, subject to the
state's maximum ....
7) Weekly cash benefits should not be limited arbitrarily regarding duration
or sum.
Millus, Federal v. State Control of Workmen's Compensation Programs, TRIAL, Mar. 1979,
at 28.
30. See id. at 28-29.
31. Id. at 31.
32. Id. at 29, 3 1.
33. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (1975) [hereinafter
cited as FASB STATEMENT No. 5]. This Statement is considered a generally accepted ac-
counting principle (GAAP). As such, it is a rule to be followed by the public accountant if
a financial statement issued by a publicly held corporation is to be certified. FASB state-
ments have been incorporated by reference into the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regulations. Annual reports or financial statements requiring SEC approval cannot
be issued without complying with the FASB statements. FASB statements do not apply to
financial practices of privately held companies not needing or unconcerned with certifica-
tion by a public accountant except by persuasion. FASB statements also do not apply to
not-for-profit institutions which neither have shareholders nor seek SEC approval of their
financial statements. See Smith, Self-Insurance andFA SB-5, in SELF-INSURANCE: A RISK
MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVE 16 (Society of Chatered Property and Casualty Underwrit-
ers ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as SELF-INSURANCE].
34. FASB Statement No. 5 defines "contingency" as "an existing condition, situation,
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crued by a charge to income if both of the following conditions are
met: (1) "information available prior to issuance of the financial
statements indicates that it is probable that an asset had been im-
paired or a liability35 had been incurred at the date of the financial
statements36 [and it is] probable37 that one or more future events
will occur confirming the fact of the loss"; and (2) "the amount of
the loss can be reasonably estimated."3 FASB Statement No. 5
can be applied to reserves for workers' compensation claims by
analogy to examples given in the statement and by analyzing the
statement's underlying rationale.
Although FASB Statement No. 5 does not address specifically
the issue of accounting for workers' compensation losses, the state-
ment does address analogous loss exposures. These areas include
obligations related to product warranties and defects; 39 risk of loss
or damage to enterprise property;' risk of loss from future injury
to others, damage to property of others, and business interrup-
or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible gain or loss to an enterprise that
will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur." FASB
STATEMENT No. 5, supra note 33, at 1. "The term loss is used for convenience to include
many charges against income that are commonly referred to as expenses and others that are
referred to as losses." Id. at 1 n.1.
35. A "liability" has been defined as "claims of creditors against the enterprise, arising
out of past activities, that are to be satisfied by the disbursement or utilization of corporate
resources." Id. at 30 (quoting AMERICAN ACCOUNTING Assoc., ACCOUNTING AND RE-
PORTING STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND PRECEDING STATE-
MENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS 16 (1957)). A liability also has been described as being "the
result of a transaction of the past, not of the future." Moonitz, The Changing Concept of
Liabilities, 109 J. AccT. 41, 44 (1960).
36. "Date of the financial statements" is interpreted as "the end of the most recent
accounting period for which financial statements are being presented." FASB STATEMENT
No. 5, supra note 33, at 4 nA.
37. FASB defines "probable" in FASB Statement No. 5 as meaning that "the future
event or events are likely to occur." Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 4. This test of 'reasonable estimation" or quantifiability of loss is consistent
with most definitions of liabilities generally requiring that the amount of an economic obli-
gation be known or susceptible of reasonable estimation before it is recorded as a liability.
See FASB STATEMENT No. 5, supra note 33, at 31 (quoting AMERICAN ACCOUNTING As-
sOC., ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS AND PRECEDING STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS 16 (1957)).
39. See FASB STATEMENT No. 5, supra note 33, at 12-13. Due to the uncertainty
surrounding claims made by warranties, warranty obligations are accruable contingencies
when (1) "based on available information, it is probable that customers will make claims
under the warranties relating to goods or services that have been sold," and (2) the liability
is estimable by looking to the experience of the enterprise or to the experience of dther
enterprises in the same business. Id. at 12.
40. See id. at 13-14. Uninsured risks or the deductible portions of insured risks per-
taining to random loss or damage of enterprise property are accruable on the occurrence of
the event, e.g., fires, explosions, storms, giving rise to the loss. Id.
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tion;4' and litigation claims and assessments.42
The virtual certainty or strong probability of liability, as well
as the reasonable estimability of such liability, underlie these
analogous loss exposures. Since liability for workers' compensa-
tion claims is fixed by state law, with the only contingency being
the extent of payments which must be made to beneficiaries, ap-
plication of FASB Statement No. 5 to uncontested claims for
workers' compensation benefits necessitates accrual of the claim.43
The amount of the liability is a function of the present value of the
periodic payment fixed by law multiplied by the number of peri-
ods payable. The periods payable are either fixed by law or sub-
ject to medical and actuarial evaluations based on the extent of
bodily impairment, duration of disability, and estimated life ex-
pectancy of beneficiaries.' Estimates as to experience of losses by
the enterprise and experiences of other similar enterprises are ad-
ditional factors allowable for assessment with respect to
probability of liability. These factors, however, bear on the extent
or value of the liability and not on its imposition, an admitted fact
41. See id. at 14-15.
[Tihe conditions... [for accrual] would be met with respect to uninsured [or
self-insured] losses resulting from injury to others or damage to the property of
others that took place prior to the date of the financial statements, even though
the enterprise may not become aware of those matters until after that date, if the
experience of the enterprise ... enables it to make a reasonable estimate of the
loss that was incurred prior to the date of its financial statements.
Id. at 15.
42. See id. at 16-19. Threatened or actual litigation, claims, or assessments may lead
to liability and accrual if the period in which the underlying cause of action has occurred
falls within the period of the current financial statements. An enterprise, in accounting for
unasserted claims or assessments, must determine the "degree of probability that a suit may
be filed or a claim or assessment may be asserted" in the current period. Probability of
unfavorable outcome and reasonable estimability of the loss are additional requirements
for accrual of liability. Id.
43. The loss exposure area most closely related to workers' compensation claims is
estimated liability for unemployment claims. Although not mentioned in FASB Statement
No. 5, the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts (AICPA), in AICPA TECHNI-
CAL PRACTICE AIDS-STATEMENTS OF POSITION OF THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS Divi-
SION § 3100.01 (July 1979), states:
The estimated unemployment insurance costs should be accrued currently based
on the client's estimated or past history of unemployment. Unemployment insur-
ance cost should be related to the period worked by the employees. Not recording
unemployment costs until claims are actually filed would result in a mismatching
of revenues and expenses. Such an approach would be unacceptable under gener-
ally accepted accounting principles.
Id.
44. Thus, calculation of the liability for accounting purposes is a function of general
present value or time value of money concepts and the various factors which are used to
compute liability under the many workers' compensation statutes. See supra note 28.
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by an enterprise choosing not to contest its liability to the
employee.
Thus, the proper financial accounting treatment for uncon-
tested claims is the charging of the present value of the periodic
payment fixed by law multiplied by the number of periods paya-
ble against income in the year in which the claim arose. An addi-
tional corresponding liability should be accrued for the unpaid
portion of the claim. The liability then should be amortized over
the payment period of the claim.45
Claims contested on the basis of whether the injury arose in
the course of employment should be considered as any normal
litigation and may lead to accrual, depending on the facts.4 6
Claims contested on the basis of percentage of disability should be
treated similarly, but unlike claims contested on the basis of injury
in the scope of employment, liability should be fixed. The basis of
these claims is merely the fair adjudication of the extent of
liability.
In addition to asserted workers' compensation claims, con-
tested or uncontested, FASB Statement No. 5 may further apply
to require accrual of current unreported claims arising from inju-
ries in the current financial reporting period. As with product and
warranty liability 7 and liability for unasserted claims generally,48
liability may have to be accrued on the basis of estimates of past
experience or other available information.
The second analytic mode for applying FASB Statement No. 5
to workers' compensation losses is found in the statement's four
underlying rationales. First, financial accounting should reflect
primarily the effects of past, not future, transactions and condi-
tions.49 This rationale, however, is not totally "past-oriented."
Accrual of a loss need not wait until the confirming future event
occurs. All that is required for such accrual is that some confirm-
ing future event will occur.50 In the workers' compensation claim
context, the event required to establish liability is the necessity of
45. [E]xposure to risk of uninsured injury to others... does constitute an ex-
isting condition involving uncertainty about the amount and timing of any losses
that may occur, which gives rise to a contingency. The matching principle re-
quires that incurred but unpaid expenses and the related liabilities be estimated in
advance and reported in the financial statements on an accrual basis.
D. KiEso & J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDiATE ACCOUNTING 417 (2d ed. 1977).
46. See supra note 42.
47. See supra note 39.
48. See supra note 42.
49. FASB STATEMENT No. 5, supra note 33, at 29.
50. Id at 30.
[Vol. 32:187
SELF-INSURED WORKERS' COMPENSATION LOSSES
making payment to the injured employee for the statutorily im-
posed liability. This event is subject to actuarial estimation.
The second rationale focuses on the existence of a "liability."'51
Beneficiaries of workers' compensation will be paid from enter-
prise resources. The event giving rise to a claim results from an
event within the last accounting period; the amount of the liability
is estimable by using fixed state or federal award amounts and
actuarial evaluations. Thus, within the purview of FASB State-
ment No. 5, a liability exists.
Third, the proper matching of expenses associated with the in-
jury of an employee engaged in the production of goods or serv-
ices in a particular year is to be charged against that year's
income. The expense is a cost of doing business that year. 2
Finally, the principle of conservatism 53 requires early or pres-
ent recognition of expenses or losses when the two criteria of
FASB Statement No. 5 are met. 4 This requirement exists prima-
rily because early recognition of unfavorable events and minimi-
zation of the amounts of net assets and net income are desirable in
financial accounting. Thus, current accrual of losses due to work-
ers' compensation claims is consistent with both the matching and
the convervatism principles. Claims which are uncontested or
contested only as to the amount of liability, and perhaps even
claims contested as to the existence of liability, may properly be
accruable currently. Application of FASB Statement No. 5 by
analogy to examples in the statement itself and analysis of the un-
derlying rationales of the statement dictate that current accrual is
the proper financial accounting treatment for workers' compensa-
tion claims.
51. See s.pra note 35.
52. The matching concept refers to the entire process of income determination: identi-
fying, measuring, and relating revenues and expenses of an enterprise for an accounting
period. It is the recognition of expense by associating costs with revenue on a cause and
effect basis. See FASB STATEMENT No. 5, supra note 33, at 33-34. See generally D. KiEso
& J. WEYGANDT, supra note 44, at 29-31.
53. Conservatism is indicated as one of the "characteristics and limitations" of
financial accounting in paragraph 35 of 4PB Statement No. 4 as follows:
Conservatism. The uncertainties that surround the preparation of
financial statements are reflected in a general tendency toward early rec-
ognition of unfavorable events and minimization of the amount of net
assets and net income.
FASB STATEMENT No. 5, supra note 33, at 35. There is a preference that any possible
errors in measurement be made in the direction of understatement rather than overstate-
ment of net income and net assets. See id. See generally D. KiEso & J. WEYGANDT, supra
note 44, at 37.
54. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of these criteria.
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In summary, managing the risks associated with employer lia-
bility for workers' compensation has become a crucial task for
most enterprises, especially because of the great financial impact
on the enterprise. The task is complicated by the multiplicity of
state regulations and constrained by the accounting profession's
requirement of disclosing transactions and plans in a prescribed
manner. To refine the analysis in this Note, the workers' compen-
sation transaction is examined in the context of self-insurance as
the risk management vehicle.
II. SELF-INSURANCE
Self-insurance is a popular and effective technique of risk
management, although other techniques, such as retrospectively
rated insurance policies,55 section 501(c) trusts, 56 and captive in-
surance companies57 also are gaining recognition. The term "self-
55. Retrospective insurance is a contract taking actual losses into account in calculat-
ing a premium. Premiums include a basic amount providing for insurer's overhead, com-
missions, and profits, to which is added a standard amount developed from a review of
actual exposures and actual cost of claim administration. The sum of these premiums is
adjusted to account for state imposed taxes. The final premium is subject to a minimum
and a maximum level or amount. See R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSUR-
ANCE 613-15 (6th ed. 1976); W. RODDA, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 431 (1966).
56. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (1976). A trust may be used to fund retained risk. The more
familiar and widespread use of the trust is to fund pension plans. Trusts, however, may be
used to fund voluntary employees' beneficiary associations providing for the payment of
life, sickness, or accident insurance, or other benefits to association members or dependents
for long-term disability and medical services. Id § 501(c)(9). Trusts also have been used to
fund the payment of supplemental unemployment compensation, id. § 501(c)(17), and to
fund liability with respect to claims for compensation for disability or death due to pneu-
moconiosis under Black Lung Acts. Id. § 501(c)(21). The advantages of a trust with § 501
status are the tax-exempt status of investment earnings and the reduction or elimination of
premium taxes, commissions, and underwriters' profits. One disadvantage is that the settlor
organization generally must relinquish direct control of claim reserves. See, e.g., Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(9)-2 (1980). Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-18, 1974-1 C.B. 139 (certain workers' com-
pensation trusts do not qualify under § 501(c)(9)).
57. A captive insurance company is one which primarily insures the risks of its par-
ent(s). It is, in effect, a formalization of self-insurance. Captives generally are classified by
their ownership and the risks they insure. United States multinational corporations histori-
cally have used captives "to reinsure portions of the risks insured by the overseas affiliate of
the United States insurers." Graves, The Insurance Subsidiary Self-Insurance Formalized,
in SELF-INSURANCE, supra note 33, at 34, 34. The most "recent area of captive use is
domestic casualty insurance (workers' compensation, products liability, general liability,
and automobile liability)." Id. Corporations owning captives generally enjoy such advan-
tages as lower cost of risk, broader coverage of risk, and increased capacity to deal with
risks. Id.
The most controversial advantage of using captives is the claim of tax deferral. If the
premiums paid to the captive are tax deductible expenditures to the parent under I.RC.
§ 162, the parent is in effect getting a deduction for a funded self-insurance program. For
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insurance" actually may be a misnomer. Traditional insurance
concepts involve risk transfer. Since risk is retained in self-insur-
ance, it is not insurance per se. Self-insurance has been defined as
a "plan of risk retention in which a program or procedure has
been established to meet the adverse results of a financial loss
which are not protected by insurance."5 8 If an employer carries
workers' compensation insurance from a casualty insurance com-
pany, self-insurance is the portion of the risk or "deductible" re-
tained by the insured.59
Self-insurance traditionally could not be utilized unless risks
could be pooled. Pooling is the aggregation of many homogene-
ous risks free from catastrophic loss from which statistical conclu-
sions may be drawn to provide an accurate prediction of future
losses.6" Another customary requirement for self-insurance to be
feasible was the ability to establish an actuarily sound fund to
cover losses. Modem fundamentals for self-insurance merely re-
quire a risk retention plan in which a program or procedure has
been established to meet adverse results of a financial loss.61
Workers' compensation is unusually adaptable to the self-in-
surance technique. Benefits are prescribed by state or federal law
and are relatively moderate in size. Few compensation cases pro-
vide a recovery of such magnitude that a serious drain on. enter-
prise assets would result. Because claims are generally payable
over a period of years, payments for losses incurred can be budg-
eted. Furthermore, predictability is obtained through precise ac-
tuarial estimates. Finally, self-insurers can develop their own
claims staffs, thereby dispensing with outside insurance adjusters.
Self-insuring workers' compensation claims provides several
advantages. First, the employer's loss prevention incentive is en-
hanced by an awareness that loss indemnification comes directly
from enterprise profits, rather than from the security buffer offered
by outside insurance. A more direct incentive to reinstate the em-
ployee quickly may be present at the management level.62 Sec-
ond, workers may be more conservative in claiming against their
own employers than they would be against a third party insurer.
reaction to this issue by the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) and the Tax Court, see
Rev. RuL 77-136, 1977-2 C.B. 53; Carnation v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978).
58. RISK AND INSURANCE, supra note 12, at 79.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Warren, Self-Insurance, An Overview, in SELF-INSURANCE, supra note 33, at 3, 7.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Third, employer contributions to the reserve accounts established
to satisfy state statutory funding and financial reporting require-
ments in the year of the accrual of the loss may provide favorable
tax treatment for self-insurers if a deduction for these accruals is
allowed.
This Note focuses on the tax treatment of these contributions.
The characteristics of the self-insurance technique are affected
greatly by the exigencies of state statutory requirements designed
to ensure the security of employer responsibility for employment-
related injury and disease. The financial statement presentation
and disclosure required by generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP) constitute further constraints. The interplay of stat-
utory liability, independent accounting requirements, the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code), and subsequent executive and judicial
interpretations of the Code form the basis for allowing or disal-
lowing a deduction for reserves by self-insuring employers. The
federal tax law authorizing deductions for reserves in general, and
for self-insurance reserves specifically, is the focus of the next
section.
III. FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF RESERVES FOR
CONTINGENT LIABILITIES AND ACCRUED EXPENSES
The statutory authority for the deduction of business expenses,
including certain reserves and accrued expenses, is section 162 of
the Code.63 The statute and regulations thereunder prescribe
three tests for proper deductibility of an expense. The expenses
must be ordinary' and necessary,65 made in pursuance of a trade
63. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976) states in pertinent part: "There shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business ... " The remainder of § 162 addresses specific exam-
ples of deductible and nondeductible items. Neither reserves nor accrued expenses are
mentioned.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 52 provides in part: "Business ex-
penses deductible from gross income include the ordinary and necessary expenditures di-
rectly connected with or pertaining to the taxpayer's trade or business, except items which
are used as the basis for a deduction or a credit under provisions of law other than section
162."
64. See Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (expense is ordi-
nary if it is normal, usual, or customary in the type of business involved and if it is not
capital or personal in nature); Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1939), where the Court
stated: "The fact that an obligation to pay has arisen is not sufficient. It is the kind of
transaction out of which the obligation arose and its normalcy in the particular business
which are crucial and controlling." Id. at 496.
65. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933) (necessary defined as meaning
"[a]ppropriate and helpful").
[Vol. 32:187
19811 SELF-INSURED WORKERS' COMPENSATION LOSSES 201
or business," and paid6" or incurred. 8 Self-insurance reserves
usually meet these criteria. The issue with respect to reserves in
general and self-insurance reserves in particular is whether an ac-
crued expense or contingent liability has been "incurred" in the
tax sense. The dispute arises because of the divergence between
accrual accounting procedures for tax and financial reporting pur-
poses.69 This dispute is primarily a result of judicial interpretation
66. Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations defines "trade or business." The
Service has compiled several judicial interpretations to formulate the following characteris-
tics for a trade or business: (1) a pursuit carried on for livelihood or for profit; or (2) a
pursuit in which a profit motive is present and where there is some type of economic activ-
ity involved, i.e., actual intent of realizing a profit and producing income; or (3) activity to
produce income (passive income, e.g., that from investments, does not qualify). DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, I.R.S. PUB. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 3 (rev. Nov. 1979).
In the landmark decision of Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933), the court
stated:
The proper test is not the reasonableness of the taxpayer's belief that a profit will
be realized, but whether it [the enterprise] is entered into and carried on in good
faith and for the purpose of making a profit, or in the belief that a profit can be
realized thereon, and that it is not conducted merely for pleasure, exhibition, or
social diversion.
Id. at 194.
67. "Paid" is given its plain meaning. This requirement is satisfied where there has
been a tender of cash, check, note, stock, etc. See, e.g., P.G. Lake, Inc. v. Commissioner,
148 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1945).
68. The heart of the issue of whether an accrued expense or a reserve for a contingent
liability will be deductible is whether an expenditure has been "incurred" within the mean-
ing of I.R.C. § 162. See infra notes 201-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
issue. Briefly, the determinative factor is whether the "all events" test embodied in Treas.
Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957) is satisfied: "Under an accrual method of accounting, an ex-
pense is deductible for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which deter-
mine the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable
accuracy." Id.
69. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969), described the
role of accrual accounting in the tax context:
"Income" has been defined as "a net or resultant determined by matching
revenues with related expenses." Since the Internal Revenue Code allows the
deduction of substantially all business expenses it seems reasonably clear that
Congress intended to tax only net business income. This objective, however, is
complicated by the fact that the tax is exacted on an annual basis whereas busi-
ness transactions are often spread over two or more years. A business may re-
ceive payment for goods or services in one tax year but incur the related expenses
in subsequent tax years. The result is that the expenses cannot be used to offset
the receipts, and the full amount of the receipts is taxed as though it were all net
"profit."
The purpose of "accrual" accounting in the taxation context is to try to allevi-
ate this problem by matching, in the same taxable year, revenues with expenses
incurred in producing those revenues. Accurate matching of expenses against
revenues in the same taxable year may occur either by "deferring" receipts until
such time as the related expenses are incurred or by "accruing" estimated future
expenses so as to offset revenue. Under the deferral concept, present receipts are
not recognized as "income" until they are "earned" by performing the related
services or delivering goods .... A corresponding principle states that expenses
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of the scant applicable sections of the Code.
In United States v. Anderson,7 ° the Supreme Court promul-
gated the "all events" test for determining the deductibility of ac-
crued expenses. The Court stated that an accrual basis taxpayer's
reserve for its munitions profits tax liability only could be de-
ducted from gross income in the year in which the reserve prop-
erly appeared on its books, rather than the following year when
the exact amount of the liability was actually paid. Since all the
events which fixed the existence and amount of the liability had
occurred in the prior year, the Court reasoned that the deduction
must be used to offset the prior year's income to accurately reflect
taxable income therein.7' The all events test has been adopted
widely by lower courts and subsequently has been embodied in
the regulations.72 Thus, an accrued expense or reserve for a con-
tingent liability will be deductible in the current tax year if it is the
year in which all the events have occurred which determine liabil-
ity and the liability amount can be determined reasonably accu-
rately. Applying this ruling has confused the courts for over fifty
years.73
This Note proceeds by analyzing the first part of the all events
test-the issue of sufficiency of existing facts to fix a liability. Six
categories of standards that the courts have considered probative
on this issue are examined. Once the liability is established, the
standards the courts have used to determine the second part of the
all events test-the reasonable estimability of the liability
amount-are reviewed. After deriving these judicial standards,
they are applied to self-insurance for workers' compensation
transactions.
A. Determination of the Existence of a Liability
Neither the Code, Treasury Regulations, nor common law
provides a clear standard for judging whether a liability has been
incurred for accrual and deduction purposes. The courts, how-
are to be reported in the year the related income is "earned" whether or not actu-
ally paid in that year.
Id. at 402-03 (footnotes omitted).
70. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
71. LId. at 441.
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957): "Under an accrual method of accounting, an
expense is deductible for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which
determine the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be determined with reason-
able accuracy."
73. See infra text accompanying notes 80-200.
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ever, consistently have considered several factors probative in de-
termining liability: (1) whether there is a fixed obligation imposed
by statute;74 (2) whether there is a fixed obligation imposed by
contract;75 (3) whether the time of payment is determinate;76 (4)
whether the particular accrual accounting system clearly reflects
income for tax purposes;" (5) whether the taxpayer is contesting
the liability's existence through litigation or otherwise;78 and (6)
whether facts which trigger liability are conditions precedent or
subsequent to the facts establishing the liability.7 9
1. Statutory Obligation
Some courts have held that state statutes may sufficiently fix
the existence of liability within the meaning of the all events test.
In Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, °8  a strip mine operator was
required to back fill an open mine after completing strip mining
operations and to post bond to ensure performance. The court
held that the taxpayer could accrue and deduct the estimated cost
of rehabilitation in the year the property was mined. The court
stated:
The Pennsylvania statute imposes a fixed and definite obliga-
tion. We cannot suspect these taxpayers of an intention not to
fulfill it ....
.... We think it is good business and good accounting
and, therefore, ought to be good tax law to allow a reasonable
estimate to be set up as a reserve for the fulfillment of this stat-
utory obligation.8 1
The Service has been hostile to this position. In a private letter
ruling, 2 the Service denied a favorable determination to a strip
74. See infra text accompanying notes 80-91.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 92-105.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 112-31.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 153-64.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 165-78.
80. 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959). See also Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002
(4th Cir. 1951) (cost of refilling strip mine held deductible in year of occurrence, even if not
ascertainable until following year).
81. 271 F.2d at 935-36.
82. The value of a private ruling is limited, as far as precedent is concerned, to the
taxpayer to whom it is issued. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1976) states that, "[u]nless the Secretary
otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination may not be used or cited as
precedent." A private ruling is nonetheless useful in that it is indicative of the Service's
position and reasoning with respect to a certain transaction under specific circumstances.
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miner situated analogously to the taxpayer in Denise Coal.13 The
Service gave three reasons why the statutory obligation did not
satisfy the "fixation of the liability" requirement. First, where an
anticipated expenditure is for the taxpayer's performance of serv-
ices or the payment for services rendered by a separate entity, no
deduction is allowable prior to actual performance. Neither the
liability itself nor payment of the service expense becomes fixed,
and hence deductible, within the meaning of Treasury Regulation
Section 1.461-1(a)(2) until the taxable year in which such services
are actually rendered.14 Second, the Service reasoned that the tax-
payer's liability to the state is not a fixed tax liability, but rather
the taxpayer's motivation for engaging in behavior giving rise to a
deduction. The reason a taxpayer incurs an expense is not rele-
vant in determining when such expense was incurred. 5 Last, the
Service asserted:
[S]tates, counties, municipalities, etc., impose statutory obliga-
tions or duties upon their corporate or individual residents
other than the reclamation of land strip-mined for coal. To
permit herein a reclamation expense deduction for the taxable
year the mining is completed is analogous to allowing a tax-
payer an expense deduction for the preparation by the tax-
payer, or a contracted for attorney or accountant, of certain
filing and information forms pursuant to a statutory obligation
in the taxable year such statutory duty arises but prior to the
time such legal or accounting services are rendered, paid for, or
due.8 6
WorldAirways, Inc. v. Commissioner 7 reached a contrary con-
clusion on facts similar to Denise Coal. The taxpayer, an air char-
ter service, was required by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to overhaul its jet engines and airframes at prescribed in-
tervals.88 Pursuant to these regulations, the taxpayer contracted
with a commercial airline to perform the maintenance and re-
pairs.8 9 For each hour flown, an accrual was established for the
cost of maintenance required by the FAA, although the work was
to be performed and paid for at prescribed intervals. The tax-
payer argued that federal regulation had imposed a liability, and
83. 75 IRS LETrER RULING REP. (CCH) 7,831,003, at 14 (April 13, 1978). This case
also involved accrued expenses for statutorily imposed land reclamation obligations.
84. Id. at 15.
85. Id. at 16-17.
86. Id. at 17.
87. 62 T.C. 786 (1974), ea-Jd, 564 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977).
88. Id. at 789-90.
89. Id. at 790.
[Vol. 32:187
1981] SELF-INSURED WORKERS' COMPENSATION LOSSES 2U.
therefore, it was entitled to a deduction for its accrual. With re-
spect to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) requirement that each
taxpayer must establish a reserve account for required mainte-
nance, the court stated:
It is apparent then, that the accounting procedures required by
the CAB are designed for financial reporting purposes and to
facilitate CAB objectives. The regulations themselves recog-
nize their divergencies from tax accounting and do not pretend
to establish practices contrary to or even related to accounting
procedures for tax purposes. 0
The court carefully distinguished Denise Coal by reasoning that
no statutory obligation to overhaul arises until a plane containing
the airframe or engine has been flown the applicable number of
flight hours. Because the operative facts had not occurred during
the taxable years in question, the petitioner's liability for the over-
haul costs had not become fixed.91
It can be concluded that a statutory obligation to perform an
act may be accepted by some courts as "fixing a liability" in lim-
ited cases where all operative facts giving rise to the obligation
have occurred. It is likely, however, that the Service will continue
to oppose this position.
2. Contractual Obligation
The second category in which courts have found sufficient
facts to fix liability is where the taxpayer incurs a valid contractual
liability. The Service and the courts agree that the existence of a
contractual obligation suffices to establish liability. A problem
arises, however, because the courts appear more flexible than the
Service in accepting certain contractual situations as binding in
establishing a fixed liability.
In Washington Post Co. v. United States,92 a taxpayer insti-
tuted a dealer profit sharing plan whereby the Post agreed to hc-
crue annually a share of its net profits for the benefit of eligible
dealers. The total accrued to the plan was determined at the end
of the year and the amount then was allocated among various ac-
counts for individual dealers.93 A dealer's share was subject to
forfeiture provisions for discontinuance of the contractual rela-
tionship with the Post. The forfeited amount then would be dis-
90. Id. at 800.
91. Id. at 803.
92. 405 F.2d 1279 (CL CL 1969).
93. Id. at 1281-82.
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tributed among the remaining dealers' accounts. Although the
Post reserved the right to unilaterally terminate or alter the plan, it
was obligated irrevocably to distribute the amount accrued at the
time of discontinuance.9a Thus, the Post was obligated absolutely
to pay the amount accrued under the plan; the only uncertainty
was the logistics of allocation among the various accounts. The
court held that because the Post was obligated irrevocably to pay
the accrued amounts, this sum was fixed at the time of accrual.95
Under the all events test, the certainty of the obligation to pay a
fixed amount is not impaired by uncertainty of either the identity
of the ultimate recipients or the time of actual payment. 96 The
court concluded that the crux of the all events test is the "certainty
of the liability" when a group liability is involved.
The Service disagreed with the Post and maintained that the
all events test only can be satisfied "when the fact of the liability
to a specified individual participant has been clearly established
and the amount of liability to each individual can be determined
with reasonable accuracy." 97 The Service appears to focus on in-
cidents of the certainty of the obligation which should assume
controlling significance only where the facts are unclear as to
whether a fixed liability exists. The Service thus fails to confront
the issue of whether the creation of a definite and fixed liability
satisfies the all events test.98
Case law, however, squarely addresses the issue of whether the
creation of a definite and fixed liability itself satisfies the all events
test. In Lukens Steel Co. v. Commissioner,99 the court upheld de-
ductions for accruals under a supplemental unemployment bene-
fits (SUB) plan. Although the ultimate recipient was unknown and
the time and amount of payment was uncertain, the court
concluded:
At the end of the company's fiscal year, the amount of the lia-
bility [was] determined by events which happened during that
year .... [T]he United Steelworkers of America [was] the
group from which the recipients must come, and the total
amount payable at any given time [was] determinable.' °
94. Id. at 1282.
95. Id. at 1283.
96. Id. at 1284.
97. Rev. Rul. 76-345, 1976-2 C.B. 134-45.
98. See Note, Deductibility of Deferred Compensation Plans Under the "All Events"
Test, 30 TAx LAW. 780, 785 (1977).
99. 442 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1971).
100. Id. at 1135. See also Cyclops Corp. v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Pa.
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Thus, the identification of specific payees was not required to sat-
isfy the all events test.
A case which reached a similar result, on like facts was Rath
Packing Co. v. Bacon.' The taxpayer entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the union whereby the taxpayer agreed
to establish a fund with a predetermined contribution formula.
The fund's proceeds were to be used to finance a committee to
study and make recommendations for the solution ofjob displace-
ment problems."2 There was an accrual by the taxpayer for the
predetermined amount but the committee was never formed and a
payout was never made.'03 In allowing the deduction, the court
held that the taxpayer's obligation was fixed by contract, stating:
"[D]eduction[s] must be viewed in light of the circumstances ex-
isting when the contract obligation was incurred."'" The liability
thus was deemed fixed despite the non-existence of an ultimate
fund beneficiary.
Many courts posit that the decisive factor under the all events
test is the "creation of an enforceable liability" in the year of ac-
crual.105 Thus, the courts appear somewhat more liberal than the
Service concerning when a contractual obligation will "fix a liabil-
ity," and seem to require less specificity with respect to payees and
time of actual payout by the taxpayer. The crucial questions are
which events fix the liability, and which aspects of the liability are
collateral details.
3. Time of Payoff
Indeterminacy as to time or payment amount has been
grounds for some courts to disallow a deduction. In Lukens
Steel, 106 uncertainty as to the time of actual payment of the liabil-
ity did not disqualify accrual of the liability. The majority of the
court was convinced that the amount accrued would be paid in a
1976). In upholding accruals to a SUB plan, the court concluded that time of actual pay-
ment is immaterial under the all events test, as long as there is "virtual certainty of full
payment of the delayed obligation to eligible employees within a reasonable period of
time." Id. at 1298.
101. 255 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
102. Id. at 809-10.
103. Id. at 811.
104. Id. at 812.
105. See, eg., Kershaw Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1963);
Clark v. Woodward Constr. Co., 179 F.2d 176, 177 (10th Cir. 1950); Willoughby Camera
Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cir. 1942).
106. 442 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1971). See supra text accompanying notes 99-100, for a
discussion of this case.
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"reasonable" period of time. A broad reading of the majority
opinion indicates that payment within a "reasonable" time will
not destroy the deductibility of an accrued item when the liability
amount is absolutely fixed. In his concurrence, Chief Judge Hastie
stated:
Since it was probable that the accruals to the fund would have
to be paid out within a relatively short time, it is unnecessary to
decide whether sums committed to such a fund as this are...
immediately deductible as an accrued business expense if the
time of future disbursement is entirely speculative and is as
likely to occur decades hence as in the near future. Yet the
opinion of the Court seems broad enough to cover that
situation. 107
Thus, if it is possible that payment will be made soon, accrual of
the liability will not be disqualified because of uncertainty as to
time of actual payment.
In Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 0 s the court disquali-
fied accrual of a liability because of its uncertainty as to time and
payment, despite its existence as fixed by facts occurring in the
taxable year. Taxpayer, an aircraft manufacturer, issued a docu-
ment entitled "Mooney Bond" with each aircraft sold. This docu-
ment created an unconditional and legally binding promise that
taxpayer would pay $1,000 to the bearer when the aircraft was
retired permanently from service. The court admitted that al-
though there was no contingency as to thefact of the liability,
there was a contingency as to when the liability would arise. The
court stated, "The most salient feature in this case is the fact that
many or possibly most of the expenses which taxpayer wishes to
presently deduct will not actually be paid for 15, 20, or even 30
years." 0 9 Accrual of the liability was so removed from the time
the money would be received by the bondholders that it would
attenuate completely, if not break, any relationship between the
two. Furthermore, the court averred that "[t]he longer the time
the less probable it becomes that the liability though incurred, will
ever in fact be-paid."I"° To justify its conclusion, the court relied
on one of the underlying rationales of the all events test-the pro-
tection of federal tax revenues by ensuring that the taxpayer will
not take deductions for expenditures that might never occur."'
107. 442 F.2d at 1135-36.
108. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969).
109. Id. at 409.
110. Id. at 410.
111. Id. at 406.
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Lukens and Mooney represent the tension existing between
conflicting rationale for the all events test. Sometimes the judicial
test, "existence of all facts fixing liability," conflicts with the gov-
emment's desire to protect the federal tax revenues. Lukens is dis-
tinguishable from Mooney because in Lukens, actual payment or
commencement of a stream of payments reasonably could be ex-
pected to occur in the near future. In Mooney, however, the bonds
did not mature for several years and payment was certain to begin
only after several years. Thus, the question as to time of payment
appears open. The greater the uncertainty of actual payment and
the longer the time period before payment commences, however,
the less likely it is that the courts will allow the deduction under
the all events test.
4. Integration of Accounting Methods
Section 446 of the Code requires that a taxpayer compute taxa-
ble income using the same accounting method employed for its
financial reporting purposes.1 12 Most corporate taxpayers are ac-
crual basis taxpayers, and the Code specifically recognizes this
method as acceptable.1 13 The Code, however, places a qualitative
restriction on acceptability of a tax accounting method, requiring
that it "clearly reflect income."'1 14 This qualitative test has caused
substantial litigation 15 involving three subissues which are central
to whether an accrued expense or, more specifically, a reserve for
a workers' compensation loss is deductible in the year in which the
expense or loss was incurred.
The first subissue in determining the acceptability of a particu-
lar acounting method is whether the method's reflection of income
for tax purposes should be evaluated by an independent standard,
or whether the Service has absolute discretion to disallow any ac-
112. I.R.C. § 446(a) (1976) provides: "Taxable income shall be computed under the
method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in
keeping his books."
113. Id. § 446(c)(2).
114. Id. § 446(b) provides: "If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable
income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly
reflect income."
The applicable Treasury Regulation states: "If the taxpayer does not regularly employ
a method of accounting which clearly reflects his income, the computation of taxable in-
come shall be made in a manner which in the opinion of the Commissioner, does clearly
reflect income." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(b)(1) (1957).
115. See Arbesfeld, G4P, theAICA, andthe Tax Law, 52 TAxas 18 (1974); Moody,
2The Relationsho of Financial and Tax Accounting, 57 TAXEs 920 (1979).
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counting method which it believes does not clearly reflect income.
For purposes of this Note, if such a viable independent standard
exists and if adherence to GAAP indicates fulfillment of this stan-
dard, then taxpayers accruing or creating reserves for losses due to
workers' compensation obligations could currently deduct these
accruals. By adhering to GAAP, the taxpayer will, by definition,
reflect income for both financial reporting and tax purposes.
Thus, adherence to GAAP is the second subissue in determining
whether an accounting method clearly reflects income. The third
subissue concerns the effect the retroactive repeal of sections 452
and 462 of the Code should have on determining whether an ac-
counting method clearly reflects income.
a. Commissioner's Discretion. In Lucas v. American Code
Co.,'16 the Supreme Court stated: "[S]ince the Commissioner has
much latitude for discretion, his interpretation of the statute's
clear-reflection standard should not be interfered with unless
clearly unlawful.""' 7 This judicial deference to the Commis-
sioner's interpretations was reaffirmed recently in Thor Power Tool
Co. V. Commissioner.I" The taxpayer had sought to devalue and
immediately expense its excess and obsolete inventory to comply
with GAAP and then deduct this write-down for tax purposes.
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer bears a heavy burden
of proof when seeking to overturn the Commissioner's findings.
Furthermore, the Commissioner's disallowance of an accounting
method will not be set aside unless plainly arbitrary.' 9
Some lower courts have attempted to limit the Court's position
by implying the existence of situations in which the taxpayer's ac-
counting method will so clearly reflect income that rejection by
the Commissioner would constitute an abuse of discretion.' 20 In
116. 280 U.S. 445 (1930). The taxpayer breached an employment contract with an em-
ployee by firing him without sufficient cause before the contract expired. The employee
sued the taxpayer who contested the liability. During the period of contest, however, the
taxpayer sought to accrue and deduct the commissions that would have been payable had
the contract not breached. For further discussion of American Code Co., see infra text
accompanying notes 153-54.
117. 280 U.S. at 449. See, e.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687
(1961); Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1958); Lucas v. Structural Steel Co., 281
U.S. 264 (1930).
118. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
119. Id. at 532-33. See also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 577 (1978)
("characterization of a transaction for financial accounting purposes, on the one hand, and
for tax purposes, on the other hand, need not necessarily be the same").
120. See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1970);
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RCA v. United States,121 RCA sought to defer prepaid income re-
ceived from the sale of service contracts for television sets. RCA
argued that income from these contracts was earned in subsequent
years and that its accounting method clearly reflected income.
122
The court outlined the statutory test of an acceptable accounting
method:
The proper test, under the statute, remains whether the ac-
counting method in question 'clearly reflects income'-that is,
in our view, whether it ensures, with reasonable precision, that
deferred revenues are included in gross income in tax years
subsequent to that in which they are received only in propor-
tion to the related services performed, and expenses incurred,
during those tax years.1
Thus, the test of whether an accounting method clearly reflects
income is whether the method accurately matches gross income
with the expenses of producing the income in the year the ex-
penses are incurred. 124 The court also concluded that RCA was
entitled, as a matter of law, to use its accounting method for tax
purposes because it passed muster under the court's interpretation
Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl.), eer. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976).
121. 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Subsequent to completion of this Note, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the RCA v. United States decision. 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981). In its opinion, the court
stated that the Commissioner's exercise of discretion must be upheld unless it is found to be
clearly unlawful. Thus, the court asserted that the task of a reviewing court is not to deter-
mine whether in its own opinion the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflects in-
come, but rather to determine whether there is an adequate basis in law for the
Commissioner's conclusion that it does not. Id. at 886. The Second Circuit appears to be
articulating a test for review which is much narrower in scope than that formulated by the
district court. While the Second Circuit focuses on whether there is some lawful basis for
upholding the Commissioner's position, the district court holds that it is the substantive
merits of the issue which must be independently analyzed. The rationale for the position of
the district court is that the ultimate underlying question remains whether a taxpayer's
method of accounting clearly reflects income. Thus, to assess the reasonableness of the
Commissioner's rejection of an accounting method, it is necessary to first analyze such
method on its merits as to whether it does clearly reflect income. See, eg, Mooney Air-
craft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1970); Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400
F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 1968) ("there must be situations where the deferral technique will so
clearly reflect income that the Court will find an abuse of discretion if the Commissioner
rejects it"); see also Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 533 (1979).
122. Deferral of prepaid income involves the other side of the coin: of accrued expenses.
Since deferral of income and accrual of future expenses are both accrual concepts, how-
ever, the reasoning and rationale are interchangeable. As such, the courts may use deferral
cases to support their conclusions in accrual cases and vice versa.
123. 499 F. Supp. at 518.
124. Seago, What Chance for Prepaid Income Deerrals Based on Statisical Estimates
After RCA, 54 . TAxeN 16 (1981).
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of the "clearly reflects income" test. Thus, it was beyond the
Commissioner's discretion to disallow the method on the grounds
that the method did not clearly reflect income.
The district court in RCA and other circuit courts of appeals
suggest that the "clearly reflects income" standard operates inde-
pendently and does not depend solely on the Commissioner's dis-
cretion. This interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent 25 if those earlier cases are viewed as addressing the is-
sue of when the Commissioner may compel the taxpayer to estab-
lish that its method of accounting "clearly reflects income" within
the purview of section 446. Unless the taxpayer meets the burden
of proof, the Commissioner's determination may not be overruled.
Moreover, since the Court has never held that the Commissioner
has absolute discretion with respect to section 446, the taxpayer
may argue convincingly that a "clearly reflects income" standard
exists separate and apart from the Commissioner's discretion.
b. Relevance of GAAP. Assuming that an independent stan-
dard of "clearly reflects income" does exist, the relationship be-
tween GAAP and the standard of "clearly reflects income" must
be analyzed. Two questions must be answered: First, whether
GAAP creates a presumption of validity of accounting methods
for tax purposes. Second, what are the roles of the differing objec-
tives of tax accounting and financial reporting?
In response to the argument that adherence to GAAP creates a
presumption of validity of the accounting method for tax pur-
poses, the Supreme Court has stated, "[No such presumption is
present. Its existence is insupportable in light of the statute, this
Court's past decisions, and the differing objectives of tax and
financial accounting."12 6 Taxpayers, therefore, do not receive a
presumption of validity of their accounting methods for tax pur-
poses by merely adhering to GAAP.
The divergent and often conflicting objectives of financial and
tax accounting constitute the strongest argument that adherence to
GAAP should not be dispositive for tax purposes. The primary
goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to
125. See supra notes 120-21.
126. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 540 (1979) (emphasis .ad-
ded). See also American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) in which the
Court stated, "To say that in performing the function of business accounting the method
employed by the Association 'is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting
principles and practices' it is not to hold that for income tax purposes it so clearly reflects
income as to be binding on the Treasury." Id. at 693.
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management, shareholders, creditors, and other interested parties.
The major responsibility of the accountant is to protect these par-
ties from the adverse effects of information failure. 27 Consistent
with this goal, financial accounting is founded on the principle of
conservatism, with the corollary that possible errors in measure-
ment should be made in the direction of understatement rather
than overstatement of net income.12 The income tax system's pri-
mary goal is the equitable collection of revenue; the Service's ma-
jor responsibility is to protect the public treasury. 29 In view of
the Treasury's different goals and responsibilities, understatement
of income cannot be its fundamental precept. 130
The numerous assumptions, axioms and principles used to
compute income for financial accounting and tax purposes mani-
fest these differences in underlying rationales. Financial account-
ing permits estimates, probabilities, and reasonable certainties,
while tax law, with its mandate to preserve revenue, cannot yield
to uncertainty.' 3' Thus, GAAP tolerates a range of reasonable
treatments, leaving the choice among alternatives to management.
Such variances, while tolerable in financial reporting, are ques-
tionable in a tax system designed to ensure that similarly situated
taxpayers pay the same tax. If management's election among ac-
ceptable options were dispositive for tax purposes, a firm essen-
tially could determine unilaterally the tax it wanted to pay,
thereby making the Code unenforceable and inequitable.
A taxpayer's use of GAAP, therefore, is not and should not be
dispositive as to whether an accounting method clearly reflects in-
come. Rather, GAAP should be followed for tax purposes in cir-
cumstances where financial accounting treatment would yield a
result favorable to, or consistent with, tax objectives. If the
financial accounting method yields a result which is unfavorable
to, or inconsistent with, tax objectives, it may be modified or alto-
gether rejected. This interpretation of GAAP's status in relation
to tax accounting concepts was articulated in Boise Cascade Corp.
v. United States. 32 In passing on the propriety of Boise's method
of deferring prepaid income, the court stated:
127. 439 U.S. at 542 (citing AICPA Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4, Ba-
sic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business En-
terprises § 171 (1970)).
128. See supra text accompanying note 53.
129. 439 U.S. at 542.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 543.
132. 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. CL 1976).
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The taxpayer must also show that its method clearly reflects
income for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus,
while generally accepted methods of accounting are of proba-
tive value and are treated with respect by Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
l(a)(2), they are not necessarily synonymous with the proper
tax accounting to be afforded an accrual item in a given
situation.133
The issue then becomes what accounting methods and proce-
dures the courts will consider consistent with tax objectives and
therefore acceptable. In American Automobile Association v.
United States, 34 the American Automobile Association (AAA)
reported as gross income only that portion of the total prepaid
annual membership dues actually received or collected in the cal-
endar year. The amount of dues reported as income ratably corre-
sponded with the number of membership months covered by
those dues within the same taxable year. The Court recognized
that GAAP required AAA to account for its membership dues in
this manner but held that since the method of matching expenses
to revenues was clearly arbitrary and based on averages and as-
sumptions about uncertain future events, the method was not ac-
ceptable for tax purposes.'35 A GAAP accounting method will be
acceptable for tax purposes where "[i]t achieves the desideratum
of accurately matching costs and revenues,"' 36 or if, with certainty
beyond that minimum necessary for financial accounting pur-
poses, it "allocates to each year the proper income and expense,
and prevents distortion of the taxpayer's financial condition in the
tax year."' 37 This position was articulated in RCA v. United
States, 38 which focused on the manner in which RCA's account-
ing method matched revenues and expenses in the tax year. The
district court held that sufficiently precise estimates may make
GAAP acceptable for tax purposes, assuming the accounting
method used also clearly reflects the taxpayer's income. 131
133. Id. at 1372.
134. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
135. Id. at 690-93. See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 180 (1963); Automobile
Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957),
136. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367, 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
137. Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1951).
138. 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981).
139. Id. at 516-17, 524. See GiUllis v. United States, 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968); Pacific
Grape Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955). 499 F. Supp. at 516-17.
524. In its reversal of RCA, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the Commissioner
pressed a broad argument that accrual accounting is never permissible without express
legislative authorization and the Commissioner's assent. The court, however, stopped short
of blindly prohibiting all accrual accounting and stated that what offends the clear reflec-
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The divergence of underlying objectives between tax and
financial accounting necessitates that GAAP be probative and ac-
ceptable for tax purposes only under certain circumstances. The
underlying axioms, principles, and rules used to compute income
for tax purposes cannot be based on arbitrary assumptions. These
assumptions must be sufficiently precise so the resulting estimate
is not subject to variance dependent on the accuracy of the under-
lying assumptions. Finally, there is an overriding limitation that
the accrual estimate must produce a result which neither contra-
dicts nor undercuts the objectives of tax accounting.
c. Repeal of Sections 452 and 462. The effect of the repeal of
sections 452 and 462 on the "clearly reflects income" standard be-
comes apparent by analyzing the sections' legislative histories.
These sections were introduced as part of the general revision of
the income tax laws in 1954. Congress was dissatisfied with the
many divergencies which had developed between the computation
of income for tax and financial reporting purposes. The differ-
ences were confined almost entirely to questions of when certain
types of revenues and expenses would be accounted for in deter-
mining net income." As a result, section 452 was enacted,14 1 per-
mitting an accrual basis taxpayer to defer the inclusion of prepaid
income in gross income until it was earned. Section 462, enacted
with section 452, permitted the current deduction of anticipated
or estimated expenses by allowing reserves to be established for
estimated expenses. 42 Nevertheless, due to estimated revenue
tion principle of § 446(b) is the "uncertainty inherent in [this taxpayer's] method of ac-
counting that relies on prognostications and assumptions about the future demand for
services." 664 F.2d at 888. Thus, the court does not flatly hold that all accruals and defer-
rals absent specific legislative authorization will be disallowed. Rather, this court found
that the assumptions upon which thisparticular taxpayer (RCA) based its accrual, were too
tenative and thus conflicted with tax accounting objectives. Further, the Supreme Court in
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. at 527, has suggested that a taxpayer may
justify its accrual accounting method by presenting hard evidence, including statistical evi-
dence. See also Gillis v. United States, 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968); Pacific Grape Prod.
Co. v. United States, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955).
140. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4017, 4073-74.
141. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 452, 68A Stat. 3, 152.
142. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 158. See S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2046, 2047.
Section 462 provided that: "[i]n computing taxable income for the taxable year, there shall
be taken into account (in the discretion of the Secretary or his delegate) a reasonable addi-
tion to each reserve for estimated expenses. . . ." Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-
591, § 462(a), 68A Stat. 3, 158. "Estimated expense" was defined as a deduction,
(A) part or all of which would... be required to be taken into account for a
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losses of one billion dollars in the first year of application and the
prospective view of the administrative unworkability of the new
sections,143 Congress retroactively repealed sections 452 and
462.144
It is questionable whether an inference may be drawn from the
repeal of these sections and subsequent congressional inaction for
the past twenty-seven years. Some courts contend that congres-
sional disapproval of all accruals and deferrals not authorized
specifically by the Code can be inferred. 145 Alternatively, it can
be inferred that accruals and deferrals are permissible because of
congressional inaction. The middle ground between these two po-
sitions is that no inference may be drawn from the enactment and
repeal of the section. Thus, accruals and deferrals are permitted
or disallowed as if sections 452 and 462 never existed.
InAmerican Automobile Association,146 the Supreme Court im-
plied that the Commissioner may reject any method of accounting
which does not treat payments received for future services as gross
income in the year of receipt. The Court based its conclusion
solely on the reasoning that congressional repeal of sections 452
and 462 indicated disapproval of arbitrary estimates in computing
taxable income."a Several lower courts, however, have refuted
this inference. 48 In Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States,"49 the
court held that repeal of the two sections "[d]oes not absolutely
preclude deferrals and accruals; it indicates that the Commis-
sioner should have very broad discretion to disallow such ac-
counting techniques when there is any reasonable basis for his
action."1 50 The Senate and House reports seem to support the
subsequent taxable year; (B) which is attributable to the income of the taxable
year or prior taxable years for which an election under this section is in effect; and
(C) which the Secretary or his delegate is satisfied can be estimated with reason-
able accuracy.
Id. § 462(d)(1).
143. H.R. REP. No. 293, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1955).
144. Act of June 15, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-73, 69 Stat. 134.
145. See, e.g., Villafranca v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1966), a 'dper
curiam, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1965-18; Simplified Tax Records v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 75
(1963). Code §§ 166-167 (1976), respectively, authorize the use of estimates in computing
deductions for bad debts and depreciation. See infra text accompanying note 146.
146. 367 U.S. 687 (1961). See supra text accompanying note 134.
147. 367 U.S. at 695. See also Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 134 (1963)
(indicating that § 452 would have a disastrous impact on government revenue).
148. See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969);
Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976).
149. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969).
150. Id. at 409.
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Mooney holding. Congressional records indicate that the repeal
was affected with an intent "to re-establish the principles of law
which would have been applicable if sections 452 and 462 had
never been enacted."'' Thus, the reasonable inference to be
drawn from repealing sections 452 and 462 is that Congress in-
tended the Code to operate as if those sections never existed.' 52
In summary, the courts will find the fact that the treatment of
the asserted deduction by the taxpayer clearly reflects income is
relevant for all events test purposes. The clearly reflects income
test is an independent test not subject solely to the Commissioner's
discretion. The Commissioner, however, may impose the burden
of proof upon the taxpayer to show that the accounting method
used clearly reflects income. Adherence to GAAP will aid the tax-
payer in carrying its burden only when the underlying objectives
of tax accounting are not frustrated. Finally, neither the taxpayer
nor the Commissioner is entitled to a favorable inference due to
the enactment and retroactive repeal of sections 452 and 462 of
the Code.
5. Active Contest of Liabili y
The fifth category that the courts examine to determine the
existence of facts fixing a liability is whether the taxpayer is con-
testing or litigating the liability. Early case law implied that a
contested liability indicated per se that all the events which fix the
liability had not occurred. In Lucas v. American Code Co., 153 the
Court stated:
151. H.R. REP. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955). See S. REP. No. 372, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2046, 2051.
152. As previously stated, §§ 452 and 462 were repealed because of the fear of a pro-
spective loss of revenue during the first year in which taxpayers could take advantage of the
two sections. Under § 462 which was repealed in 1955, deductions could be taken in the
transitional year for expenses attributable to advances taxed in prior years under a claim of
right theory, as well as for reserves for future expenditures attributable to advances re-
ceived and reported during that year. This procedure would give rise to a "double deduc-
tion" in the transitional year. See S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955); H.R. REP.
No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1955).
Currently a large consortium of corporations is lobbying in favor of a bill which seeks
to amend the Code to allow deductions for incurred but unpaid losses that the taxpayer can
assert as reasonably estimable. The proposed bill differs from repealed § 462 in that it
narrows the scope of the deduction. The bill would not allow a deduction for estimated
and contingent expenses. The bill also contains a five year phase-in to mitigate the adverse
transitional effects on federal revenues. Telephone interview with Robert Reeves, Vice
President-Insurance, Hospital Corporation of America, Chairman, Captive Insurance Co.
Assoc. (Jan. 7, 1981).
153. 280 U.S. 445 (1930), discussed at supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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While the facts determining liability had occurred in the year
of the breach, the amount to be recovered, if there was legal
liability, depended in large part on the course of future events.
. . . And, when liability is contested, the institution of a suit
does not, of itself, create certainty of loss.
154
In Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner,'-- the Court reaf-
firmed the principle that all the events have not occurred in the
tax year to fix the amount and fact of liability when the liability is
contingent and contested by the taxpayer. 5 6 In Dixie Pine, Mis-
sissippi assessed and collected a gasoline tax from the taxpayer in
1936. Dixie Pine subsequently filed suit to recover the tax paid on
the basis that it was exempt from such taxation. In 1937, Dixie
Pine accrued and deducted, but did not actually pay, an amount
for the gasoline tax while still contesting the liability. The Court
held that the taxpayer was not entitled to the 1937 deduction and
only could claim a deduction for the taxable year in which the
liability was finally adjudicated. 5 7 Notably, the Court did not
question the validity of the 1936 deduction which was actually
paid but nevertheless still being litigated. The Court only disal-
lowed the accrued deduction currently being litigated.
The Supreme Court has gone even further than Dixie Pine
with respect to contested liabilities. In United States v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., "I the taxpayer paid a property tax and interest
penalty to New York City to avoid property seizure while con-
testing the legality of the tax. The Court held the taxpayer could
not even deduct the paid portion of the tax during the contest as it
was more a deposit than an expense. 59 To alleviate the harshness
154. 280 U.S. at 450-51.
155. 320 U.S. 516 (1944).
156. Id. at 519.
157. Id. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944), where
petitioner paid $93,000 in 1935 in federal processing taxes and accrued and deducted
$10,000 more while contesting the constitutionality of the tax. Citing Dixie Pine as control-
ling, the Court held that the petitioner was not in a position to treat the $10,000 as an
accrued liability because it denied liability for the tax and failed to pay the accrued portion
during 1935. The Court, however, allowed the deduction for the $93,000 paid, notwith-
standing the petitioner's contest of that portion of the liability. The Court stated, "The
amount thus paid is not involved [in this dispute]." Id. at 282.
158. 366 U.S. 380 (1961).
159. The Court stated:
"Payment" is not a talismanic word. It may have many meanings depending on
the sense and context in which it is used .... "A payment may constitute a
capital expenditure, an exchange of assets, a prepaid expense, a deposit, or a cur-
rent expense" and "[wihen the exact nature of the payment is not immediately
ascertainable because it depends on some future event, such as the outcome of
litigation, its treatment for income tax purposes must await that event."
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of Consolidated Edison and to restore the narrow exception of de-
ductibility for paid portions of contested liabilities, Congress en-
acted section 461(f) as an amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.16° Although the statute was designed to reverse the
effects of Consolidated Edison by allowing a deduction for con-
tested liabilities actually paid by the taxpayer, the Regulations 61
and subsequent judicial interpretation 162 have greatly narrowed
its practical use. A taxpayer seeking the deduction, for example,
must place an amount of money equalling the total potential lia-
bility beyond his or her control and relinquish authority over it. 163
Additionally, if the taxpayer wants to use a trust vehicle to estab-
lish the reserve, the consent of the claimant first must be
obtained. 164
Thus, Consolidated Edison has removed the narrow exception
allowing taxpayers to deduct disputed liabilities which were paid.
Deductions for liabilities being litigated or contested will be disal-
Id. at 391 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir.
1960)).
160. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 223(a)(1), 78 Stat. 19, 76 (codified at
I.R.C. § 461(f) (1976)) provides:
If - (1) the taxpayer contests an asserted liability, (2) the taxpayer transfers
money or other property to provide for the satisfaction of the asserted liability, (3)
the contest with respect to the asserted liability exists after the time of the transfer,
and (4) but for the fact that the asserted liability is contested, a deduction would
be allowed for the taxable year of the transfer (or for an earlier taxable year), then
the deduction shall be allowed for the taxable year of the transfer.
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (1964) provides in relevant part:
A taxpayer may provide for the satisfaction of an asserted liability by transferring
money or other property beyond his control (i) to the person who is asserting the
liability, (ii) to an escrowee or trustee pursuant to a written agreement (among the
escrowee or trustee, the taxpayer, and the person who is asserting the liability)
that the money or the property be delivered in accordance with the settlement of
the contest, or (iii) to an escrowee or trustee pursuant to an order of the United
States, any State or political subdivision thereof, or ... to a court with jurisdic-
tion over the contest.
162. See, e.g., Poirier & McLane Corp. v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1976).
The taxpayer, a contractor, was sued by property owners adjacent to construction sites.
The taxpayer, aware that its insurance did not cover liability for trespass, established a
reserve to cover the estimated value of the claims. Pursuant to this plan, the taxpayer
deposited $1.1 million of securities into an irrevocable trust. The balance was to be re-
turned to the taxpayer upon the disposition of the trespass claims. The court noted that
§ 461(f) was to be construed narrowly to forestall potential abuses and held the mere trans-
fer of funds was insufficient to establish the fact and amount of the liability. If it were
otherwise, the taxpayer could unilaterally "manufacture" a deduction not realistically
matching receipts and disbursements for specific taxable years. Thus, the essential require-
ment for deduction which is absent in this case is claimants' agreement to the establishment
of the trust. The rationale is that the agreement is, in effect, the equivalent of a direct
payment of the asserted claim. It fixes the fact and amount of the liability.
163. Treas. Reg. § IA61-2(c)(1)(ii) (1964).
164. 547 F.2d at 167.
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lowed, even when the taxpayer has paid the disputed liability, un-
less the requirements of section 461(f) are met. Due to the
administrative burdens on the taxpayer, however, the relief provi-
sions of section 461(f) basically are unavailable.
6. Conditions Precedent Versus Conditions Subsequent
The character of certain contingencies surrounding facts which
give rise to liability may impact on the fixation of liability for tax
purposes. If the contingent event is a condition precedent to the
liability, this fact indicates that all the events which fix liability
have not occurred. If, however, the contingent event is a condi-
tion subsequent to the liability, then sufficient facts exist to fix the
liability and only the amount and/or certainty of the payment,
rather than imposition of liability is at issue. Thus, existence of an
unfulfilled condition precedent precludes liability.1 65 Existence of
a condition subsequent goes to the certainty of payment, the sec-
ond prong of the all events test. An unfulfilled condition subse-
quent has no effect on whether a liability is fixed.
166
If a condition precedent fails to occur, an obligation to pay will
never arise. 167 A condition precedent, defined by what a claimant
needs to show to establish liability, is an event which must occur
to perfect a right in the claimant.' 68 Such a condition is a fact
other than mere lapse of time which must exist or occur before a
duty of immediate performance of a promise arises.' 6
9
A condition subsequent, if fulfilled, might diminish or termi-
nate an existing liability.170 An expense item accrues when the
fixed obligation is incurred even though the amount is not pres-
ently due or may be diminished by subsequent events.' 7 ' Thus,
while the existence of an absolute liability is required for a per-
missible deduction, absolute certainty that it will be paid is not so
required. 172 The distinction between precedent and subsequent is
165. World Airways v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 786, 804 (1974), af 'd, 564 F.2d 886 (9th
Cir. 1977).
166. Id. at 803.
167. Id. at 804.
168. See Lawyers' Title Guar. Fund v. United States, 508 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975).
169. United States v. Schaeffer, 319 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1963).
170. 62 T.C. at 803.
171. Ohmer Register Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 1942).
172. Spring City Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934). See Helvering v. Russian
Fin. & Constr. Corp., 77 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1935) ('It]hat the liability may not subse-
quently be discharged by payment does not necessarily prevent its consideration as a liabil-
ity for the years accrued").
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that the former goes to the issue of fixing the liability itself, while
the latter goes to the issue of certainty of payment or amount
eventually paid.
The issue when using a condition precedent versus a condition
subsequent to determine if a liability is fixed is whether a contin-
gent event is precedent or subsequent to the liability. In World
Airways v. Commissioner,173 the taxpayer had contracted with a
commercial airline to have its aircraft periodically serviced. The
court held that a condition precedent existed because petitioner
could not be bankrupt at the time of service and the aircraft had to
be in existence when the service was performed. The occurrence
of an air crash, permanent grounding, retirement of the aircraft, or
bankruptcy of the taxpayer would prevent the maintenance obli-
gation from arising. 174 Thus, the court disallowed accrual of the
maintenance costs as a result of these conditions precedent to tax-
payer's liability.1 7
5
In W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Commissioner, 76 the taxpayer, a fur-
niture manufacturer, regularly had consigned furniture to dealers
under contracts entitling them to commissions upon sale of the
furniture. No commission was due and payable, however, until
the dealer collected the sales price and remitted it to Badcock.
Badcock, an accrual basis taxpayer, reported the full sales price as
income in the year of sale. The corporation also claimed the total
sales commissions as deductions before collecting payment from
the dealer and paying the commissions. In upholding the tax-
payer's accounting method, the court stated that risk of noncollec-
tion (by the dealer) in a credit transaction was not a condition
defeating fixed liability. The commissions, though payable only
upon collection of the sales price, were incurred and became fixed
liabilities within the taxable year of sale.17
7
Another contractual situation in which the court found a con-
dition subsequent did not defeat liability, was present in Helveiing
v. Russian Finance & Construction Corp ." The taxpayer, a do-
mestic corporation, contracted with an association of manganese
producers and the Soviet government to purchase 600,000 tons of
173. 62 T.C. 786 (1974), aft'd, 564 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1978).
174. Id. at 804.
175. Id.
176. 491 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1974).
177. Id. at 1229. See Ohmer Register Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 682 (6th Cir.
1942) (fixed but unpaid sales commissions payable only upon collection of sales price held
accruable expense deductions).
178. 77 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1935).
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ore at market price and pay an additional two dollars per ton at
the end of ten years from the date of the agreement. The agree-
ment discharged the taxpayer of any obligation to pay the addi-
tional two dollars per ton upon mutual termination of the
continuing supply and purchase agreement, breach by the Soviet
government, or the occurrence of strikes seriously handicapping
the producers' ability to supply ore. The taxpayer ratably accrued
and deducted the two dollars per ton as the ore was received. The
court held that the liability arose upon delivery of the ore. Even
though the liability might never be paid, an enforceable obligation
existed upon receipt of the ore. The additional two dollars per ton
constituted part of the ore's cost and was accrued properly on re-
ceipt of the ore.
The pattern in Russian Finance indicates a condition subse-
quent. Where a service has been rendered to the taxpayer, pay-
ment has been earned by the creditor, and only facts relating to
amount and time of payment remain to be determined, courts will
usually find a condition subsequent. Alternatively, a typical con-
dition precedent is evidenced by an executory contract. The credi-
tor has not performed the service and must wait for conditions to
occur before performing its contractual obligation and thereby ob-
ligating the taxpayer to its claim.
The analysis thus far has considered six factors courts have
used to test whether the first part of the all events test-whether
sufficient facts have occurred to fix the liability for federal income
tax purposes-has been fulfilled. These six factors 17 9 are not mu-
tually exclusive. Several factors may apply in a single case.
Courts also have not considered any one factor as more disposi-
tive than another. Many courts, however, focus on one or two
factors and then render an opinion based on analysis of only the
few factors examined. When a court does find sufficient facts to
fix liability, it will then examine the second part of the all events
test-whether the liability amount can be determined reasonably
179. To summarize, the six factors which have been discussed are:
(I) Whether there is a statutorily fixed obligation;
(2) Whether there is a contractually fixed obligation;
(3) Whether liquidation of the liability is near or remote in time;
(4) Whether the accrual accounting system in issue clearly reflects income for
tax purposes;
(5) Whether the taxpayer is contesting the existence of the liability through liti-
gation or otherwise; and
(6) Whether facts triggering liability are conditions precedent or conditions sub-
sequent to facts establishing liability.
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accurately. 180
B. Amount of Liability Reasonably Ascertainable
As early as United States v. Anderson,II' when the Supreme
Court created the all events test, the issue was raised of whether
an expense could be accrued when the exact amount was un-
known. If this issue were resolved affirmatively, then a subsidiary
issue would be raised concerning the required degree of certainty
or accuracy as to this amount. In 1929, in Lucas v. American Code
Co.,'8 2 the Court implied in dictum that only a reasonable esti-
mate of loss was necessary to satisfy the second part of the all
events test.18 3 Reasonableness was assessed by relating the compu-
tation of the reserve to the loss.'
8 4
In Uncasville Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,I5 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized the common law
position on the degree of reasonableness necessary to satisfy this
second part of the all events test. In Uncasville, the taxpayer's tax-
able income for 1918 was increased after an audit by the Service.
The increase caused a concomitant state income tax adjustment
since the state tax was based on federal taxable income. The ques-
tion was whether the additional state tax would be allowable as a
deduction against federal taxable income in 1918, the year to
which the state tax applied, or in 1925, the year in which the defi-
ciency was assessed. The court held that 1918 was the proper year
of deduction: "All the facts upon which the calculation depended
had been fixed before the expiration of the year 1918. . . . The
computation was uncertain, but its basis was unchangeable; it was
unknown, not unknowable at December 31, 1918.''Is6
Thus, for a taxpayer to accrue an item of expense, the liability
amount computable only must be reasonably, but not exactly esti-
mable at the end of the taxable year. Problematically, the courts
never have articulated a clear definition of "reasonable accuracy."
Some decisions indicate that greater emphasis will be placed on
the method by which a taxpayer has computed the expense rather
than on a comparison between the estimated amount and the sub-
180. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957).
181. 269 U.S. 422 (1926). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
182. 280 U.S. 445 (1929). See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
183. 280 U.S. at 451.
184. Id. at 451-52.
185. 55 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1932).
186. Id. at 895.
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sequently determined actual expense. If the court determines that
proper information was not used or improper assumptions were
made in computing the liability, a disallowance of the accrual re-
suits, regardless of the estimate's accuracy.'87
Courts generally have required evidence of the use of one of
two methods to compute the accrual within reasonableness guide-
lines. The strict and inflexible standard requires a fixed date for
future payments. The newer and more flexible standard allows
the use of statistics, the law of large numbers, and estimates based
on prior experience # the method properly matched income and
expenses for tax accounting purposes.18
8
The strict standard was established in Brown v. Helvering.89
The taxpayer sold several fire insurance policies and attempted to
deduct an estimated accrual representing lost commissions due to
cancelled policies. The taxpayer was unable, and did not attempt,
to identify which particular policies would be cancelled before ex-
piration. The taxpayer attempted to deduct the accrual by esti-
mating the average effect on all the policies. The Court implicitly
rejected the taxpayer's use of aggregate estimates, stating that in-
surance companies are permitted to analyze their operations on a
group basis only because of specific statutory authorization.190
The Court also stated that the taxpayer's method of computing his
estimate based on aggregate experience did not reflect the expense
with reasonable certainty.' 9' This determination may leave the
door open for other courts to imply that the flexible standard is
consistent with Brown if estimates based on aggregate experience
187. See Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959), dlscussed in
supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. In considering the issue of the accuracy of the
cost of backfilling the stripmine, the court was impressed with Denise's use of independent
engineers, contractors, and accountants to scientifically arrive at an estimate. Concluding
that the estimation process was reasonable, the court allowed current deduction of accrual
despite the estimate being more than a 100% overstatement of actual subsequent cost. Cf.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. United States, 455 F.2d 993 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'don
other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973). The Court of Claims disallowed an accrual of vacation
pay that varied only 5.3% from actual cost. The railroad had possessed data which the
court thought more reliable than that used to compute the vacation pay accrual. The court,
therefore, did not sanction the method used to compute the accrual. See generally
Hawekotte, How "All Events" Test for Deduction of Accrued Expenses is Presently Being
Applied, 21 TAx AccT. 26 (1978).
188. See supra notes 112-52 and accompanying text.
189. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
190. Id. at 201. For the present treatment of insurance company taxation, see I.R.C.
§§ 801-841 (1976) (Subchapter L).
191. Id.
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are sufficiently precise.'92
The district court in RCA v. Commissioner193 seized the oppor-
tunity to hold that a deferral based on sufficiently precise esti-
mates using statistical analysis fits within the standard of Brown.
The court distinguished the familiar trilogy of American Automo-
bile Association v. United States, 194Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner,95 and Schlude v. Commissioner 96 based on the ex-
traordinary accuracy with which the taxpayer, RCA, computed its
income deferral. The court then held that a taxpayer is entitled to
utilize reliable statistical projections of anticipated expenses in de-
termining the extent to which prepaid amounts should be included
in gross income in tax years other than the year of receipt. The
proper test is whether use of statistical estimates assures accurate
matching of expenses to related revenue in the taxable year. The
court in RCA interpreted the holdings of American AutomobileAs-
sociation and Automobile Club of Michigan as merely requiring
that the taxpayer's method of accounting meet a heavy burden of
proof that any income deferred will be earned actually in the fu-
ture. The AAA and Automobile Club of Michigan failed to meet
this burden, not because they used estimates, but because of the
arbitrariness of the method used in computing such estimates. 197
The court in RCA held that the taxpayer's method of accounting
for advance payments in Schlude was found "'artificial,' and
therefore impermissible," because "services [were] to be per-
formed 'only upon customers' demand without relation to fixed
dates in the future.' "198 The problem was not that the time of
performance was unspecified, but rather that the extent of per-
formance was unspecified. Consequently, there was no assurance
192. Cf. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH)
1039 (1959), rev'd, 283 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1960), vacatedper curiam, 367 U.S. 906 (1961),
aed, 293 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 976 (1962) (where the taxpayer
was entitled to deduct certain amounts accrued on its books as estimates of sums it would
have to pay in settlements of personal injury and property claims).
193. 499 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
194. 367 U.S. 687 (1961). For a discussion of 4A4, seesupra text accompanying notes
134 & 146-47.
195. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
196. 372 U.S. 128 (1963). In Schlude, the taxpayer, a dance studio operator, required
students to sign contracts providing for advance payment for all lessons given on install-
ment payments no matter when or whether the student actually took the lessons. The
Court held that the taxpayer could not defer prepaid income for the portion of the contract
price attributable to lessons not yet given in the current tax year because contingencies
were likely to occur such as students letting contract rights expire before lessons.
197. See 367 U.S. at 693-94; 353 U.S. at 189.
198. 499 F. Supp. at 515 (quoting Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963)).
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that the accounting method' employed would accurately match
revenues and related expenses. 199
All that Schlude and AA4 require is the reporting of deferred
income concurrently with the occurrence of the related ex-
penses . °° Thus, it appears that the essence of the second part of
the all events test-reasonable estimation of the expense-is heav-
ily dependent on the first part of the test-facts evincing a fixed
liability. The overall issue, therefore, is whether, within defined
tax objectives, the taxpayer's accounting method accurately
matches expenses to income in the current taxable year. If the
taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflects income within the
tax meaning of the phrase, then a fortiori, all the events which fix
liability have occurred, and the method used to compute the
deferral or accrual is reasonable. Thus, the essence of the all
events test is properly identifying constraints placed on accounting
systems in which financial accounting objectives differ from tax
objectives.
Once the essence of the all events test is analyzed and devel-
oped, it can be applied to estimated accruals of reserves for work-
ers' compensation losses. The following section presents the
Service's position and early case law on this topic. The analyses
of the few modem cases which have passed on the issue of deduct-
ibility of these reserves then are examined. Finally, the all events
test, as developed in this section, is applied to the workers' com-
pensation accrual situation.
199. Id. at 514. See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. at 142 (Stewart J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart noted that the majority's reference to "estimated cancellations" as the cure
for the defect (in taxpayer's "arbitrary" accounting method) dispelled any suggestion that
the broad but cryptic language used by the Court in.4merican ,4utomobile4ssociaiion was
intended to bar use of statistical projections, provided that they were supported adequately.
200. See Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1969).
In Pacific Grape Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955), taxpayer at-
tempted to accrue as an expense the costs of canning, labeling, packing, and shipping for
fruit sold but not yet prepared. The Court stated:
Not only do we have here a system of accounting which for years has been
adopted and carried into effect by substantially all members of a large industry,
but the system is one which appeals to us as so much in line with plain common
sense that we are at a loss to understand what could have prompted the Commis-
sioner to disapprove it. Contrary to his suggestion that petitioner's method did
not reflect its true income it seems to us that the alterations demanded by the
Commissioner would wholly distort that income.
Id. at 869.
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IV. FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF RESERVES FOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The current position of the Service is identical to that taken by
the early courts passing on the deductibility of self-insurance and
workers' compensation accruals. The Service contends that tax-
payers may not deduct the reserves that they establish to pay for
unknown losses. Although the taxpayer will get a deduction for
these losses when they become "fixed and determinable," only af-
ter-tax dollars will be available to invest toward payment of these
losses until that time. The Service's position is paradoxical be-
cause if the taxpayer hadpurchased insurance, the premiums paid
would be deductible. Under the authority of Subchapter L of the
Code,20 1 however, the commercial insurance company would have
been able to establish a deductible reserve computed on an aggre-
gate of claims experience basis. The self-insured taxpayer thus is
forced to absorb the loss until it is actually payable, at which time
the taxpayer receives the deduction. An insurance company, how-
ever, is permitted to deduct the potential losses based on esti-
mates. The common law derivation of the Service's position is
presented in the next section.
A. Early Case Law
This inflexible position concerning deductions for self-insur-
ance reserves has its roots in two early Board of Tax Appeals
cases. In Pan-American Hide Co. ,202 the taxpayer established a
reserve for an amount equal to the premiums which would have
been paid had fidelity insurance been obtained. The court held
that the reserve, unlike depreciation, was not authorized specifi-
cally in the Code. Additionally, the reserve was not deductible as
an insurance premium because there was no risk shifting. 20 3
The deductibility of self-insurance reserves for workers' com-
pensation losses was first addressed by the Board of Tax Appeals
201. I.R.C. §§ 801-841 (1976).
202. 1 B.T.A. 1249 (1925).
203. Id. at 1250. For two recent cases in which taxpayers unsuccessfully argued that
the deduction for contributions to the reserve account was based on the theory of the con-
tribution as an insurance premium, see Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d
279 (5th Cir. 1978); Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978). Both the Service
and the courts view the taxpayers' theory as problematic because an insurance premium
must transfer risk of loss to an unrelated insurer. Self-insurance fails to qualify as insur-
ance because no risk is transferred to an unrelated entity. Risk of loss remains with the
self-insurer.
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in Spring Canyon. Coal Co. v. Commissioner.2° Pursuant to a
Utah workers' compensation law, the taxpayer elected to self-in-
sure and established an independent operation to administer
claims.2°5 The operation was funded by the taxpayer with an
amount equal to the premium which would have been paid had
insurance from the state fund been purchased.20 6 The fund's size
also was monitored by the Industrial Commission of Utah.2 7 As
a result, the taxpayer contended that it should have been permit-
ted to accrue, for income tax purposes, the payments made to the
fund. The court flatly asserted that "the amount of the reserve
does not constitute an ordinary and necessary business expense
and is, therefore, not deductible."20 8 The opinon focused on the
deductibility of these payments under the theory that they consti-
tuted payments to a bona fide trust. The all events test was ig-
nored completely.20 9
Some modem courts have taken these sparsely reasoned cases
to establish "an essentially unqualified principle that self-insur-
ance reserves are not deductible for income tax purposes." 210 This
principle appears to remain intact even when the contributions are
equivalent to arm's-length premiums, ordinary insurance is un-
available, and reserves are established pursuant to state insurance
commissioner guidelines. When developing this prohibition, the
Board of Tax Appeals did not analyze these cases under the ra-
tionale of the all events test. Furthermore, the Board did not in-
quire whether the liability had been accepted for cases unsettled at
the year's end or where claims were fixed but uncontested. This
early case law position is inflexible and unresponsive to the exi-
gencies of modem corporate risk management. Several recent de-
cisions, however, have created cracks in this traditional (though
204. 13 B.T.A. 189 (1928), appeal denied, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 654 (1931).
205. Id. at 190-91.
206. Id. at 191.
207. Id. at 194.
208. Id. at 195.
209. The court rejected the argument that Spring Canyon had established a bona fide
trust. Nevertheless, it implicitly accepted the proposition that had the taxpayer successfully
established a trust pursuant to trust law rules, the payments to the trust would be deducti-
ble. See Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co., 5 B.T.A. 464 (1926). The court specifically
rejected the taxpayer's arguments that the payments constituted insurance premiums and
that the taxpayer was in effect an insurer and able to utilize the favorable aggregate estima-
tion for the loss provisions of subchapter L. 13 B.T.A. at 195-96, 199-201.
210. Note, Federal Taxation Concepts in Corporate Risk Assumption" Self-Insurance, the
Trust, and the Captive Insurance Company, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 781, 805 (1978).
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questionable) barrier.2 '
B. Modern Case Law
In Thrftimar, Inc. v. Commissioner,2"2 the taxpayer was self-
insured for workers' compensation under California law. The law
required the taxpayer to post a surety bond for 125 percent of the
reserve account for workers' compensation losses. Both taxpayer's
reserve account and claims administration were handled by an in-
dependent insurance management firm which computed estimates
of losses on an individual claim basis. Nonetheless, the Commis-
sioner contended, and the court agreed, that the portion of the
accrual representing losses payable in the future was not deducti-
ble until paid. Accordingly, that portion of the accrual which con-
tained a provision for contested losses under the authority of Dixie
Pine v. Commissioner213 was disallowed.2" 4 Furthermore, since
the taxpayer was not liable until an injured employee actually in-
curred medical expenses or was absent from work for more than
seven days, the court disallowed petitioner's accrual which con-
tained estimates for claims before these conditions were
satisfied.215
In analyzing the taxpayer's accrual, the court did not separate
contested claims and claims for which liability had not yet been
fixed under California law from claims where the petitioner had
admitted liability and the statutory conditions imposing liability
had occurred. The court ignored the existence of taxpayer's
claims which were not subject to the conditions preventing impo-
sition of statutory liability. The court, instead, stated that claims
which satisfied all the statutory conditions were "subject to the
contingencies of a preexisting malady, doubtful or imprecise med-
ical diagnosis, development of medical complications or changed
conditions. '216 The court confused the events fixing the liability
with conditions bearing on the liability amount. The court also
interpreted events which normally identify the existence of a con-
dition subsequent to be indicative of a condition precedent.217
211. See id. at 805-07.
212. 59 T.C. 598 (1973).
213. 320 U.S. 516 (1944). For a discussion of Dixie Pine, see supra notes 155-57 and
accompanying text.
214. 59 T.C. at 607.
215. Id. at 608.
216. Id. at 609.
217. Conditions subsequent and conditions precedent are discussed at supra notes 165-
80 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the court erred by characterizing facts which affect the
amount of the liability as facts which affect the actual existence of
the liability.
The deficiencies in the Thr[i'mart opinion were identified in
Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner.218 The tax-
payer, a California corporation, established a reserve account for
accrued workers' compensation losses. The same independent in-
surance management firm as in Thrftimart administered the ac-
count and calculated claims on an individual basis. Taxpayer's
accrual, however, excluded all reserves for contested claims. The
court held that the injury itself, if uncontested by the employer,
establishes liability under the California statute and implicitly es-
tablishes liability in a no-fault situation in which the employer
does not contest that the injury was employment related. Thr f
timart was distinguished on the basis that there were contingen-
cies, such as imprecise medical diagnoses and medical
complications, which confused the issue of fixing the liability with
reasonable estimation of the amount. The crucial aspect of the
opinion in Crescent Wharf is that the injury itself is sufficient to
establish the facts fixing liability.219
The same tax court which decided Thrif/imart subsequently
followed Crescent Wharf in Wien ConsolidatedAirlines v. Commis-
sioner.22 In Wien, the petitioner's accrual was for the present
value of death claim benefits to the wives and children of three of
its pilots killed in the scope of employment. Under Alaska law,
strict liability is imposed on the employer at the time of the em-
ployee's death in a work-related accident. The petitioner did not
contest liability and the court found that facts fixing liability had
occurred upon the pilots' deaths.221 Since the contingencies of the
possible remarriage of the wives or the death of the children
before expiration of the statutory benefits were of such a nature
that the pre-existing liability might be terminated, they were
218. 59 T.C. 751 (1973), rev'd, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975).
219. 518 F.2d at 775. The Court of Appeals, however, remanded the case to the trial
court to rule on whether the method of computation yielded a reasonable estimate of the
loss. Crescent Wharf agreed on remand that it was not entitled to an accrual for 1964 and
1965 since it could not locate records necessary to identify the cases remaining uncontested
at the end of those two years. The company could identify the uncontested cases as of
December 31, 1966. Since the accrual was proven to be quite accurate, as evidenced by
subsequent payouts on these cases, a deduction was allowed for the accrual as of that date
and judgment was entered in the Tax Court pursuant to a stipulation. See Hawekotte,
supra note 187, at 31.
220. 60 T.C. 13 (1973), aft'd, 528 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1976).
221. Id. at 15.
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deemed conditions subsequent and not conditions precedent.222
Thr#i'mart was distinguished by examining the relevant statutes.
Under California's workers' compensation statutes, liability is not
fixed until medical services are rendered or the employee is absent
from work for seven days. In Alaska, however, liability fixes upon
injury.223 In assessing the reasonable estimation of the liability,
the court stated: "[I]f a condition subsequent is unlikely to occur,
its existence will not prevent the amount of a liability from being
reasonably certain."' 4
The Service has indicated the reasoning of Crescent Whaf and
Wien will not be followed, and the issue of accrual for self-insur-
ance reserves for workers' compensation losses will be litigated.225
The Service maintains that the mandate of Brown v. Helvering22 6
and subsequent case law prohibits accruals and deferrals based on
estimates not authorized by statute. 2 7
C. Accrual of Workers' Compensation Losses Under the All
Events Test
The analysis in Crescent Wharf and Wien is helpful but in-
complete. Accrual of reserves for workers' compensation losses is
part of the bigger issue of the deductibility of reserves in general
under the all events test. The facts and exigencies of an accrual
must be viewed in light of the concepts developed in part III
above as to whether a particular transaction qualifies for accrual
and deduction under the all events test.
1. Facts Fixing Liability
The first part of the all events test is satisfied if a siatute oper-
ates to fix the obligation upon occurrence of all the operative facts
necessary to trigger liability.228 The Service has acquiesced on
this point. The issue becomes whether all the operative facts have
occurred to trigger a statute's operation to fix liability, not whether
222. Id.
223. Id. at 16.
224. Id. at 17. Thus, the court finally held, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that since
there was a 97% actuarial chance that the children would live to age 19, accrual for benefits
to be paid to them was permissible. With respect to accruals for the widows, since peti-
tioner's estimate did not take a remarriage factor into account, these accruals were consid-
ered unreasonable and were disallowed. 528 F.2d at 738.
225. Rev. RuL 80-191, 1980-2 C.B. 168; Rev. RuL 70-262, 1970-1 C.B. 122.
226. 291 U.S. 193 (1934). See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
227. See, ag., I.R.C. § 166 (1976) (bad debts); id. § 167 (depreciation).
228. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
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it is applicable to fix liability. Crescent Wharf and Wien estab-
lished that it is the injury itself which fixes liability in a no-fault
situation. This conclusion implies that the only operative fact nec-
essary to trigger liability is the injury of the employee while acting
within the course and scope of employment. The Service might
argue, as it did in Thritimart, that there are additional operative
facts which cannot be accounted for and must be determined
before all operative facts can be said to have occurred. As stated
earlier, the Service is confusing facts which impose orfix liability
with those bearing on the extent of the liability. With an uncondi-
tional no-fault statute, the better reasoned position is that the op-
erative facts occur and liability becomes fixed when the injury
arises within the course and scope of employment and the em-
ployer chooses not to contest the claim on the scope of employ-
ment issue.
The Service and the courts agree that in some circumstances, a
contractual arrangement may give rise to an accrual deduction.229
Although the basis of workers' compensation obligations is statu-
tory, contract litigation provides a useful analogue to the determi-
nation of liability on an aggregate basis. Most courts seem to hold
that the crux of the all events test is certainty of liability or crea-
tion of an enforceable liability and not whether a liability is estab-
lished to any particular person. These cases, however, involve
profit-sharing, SUB, and unemployment funds which by their na-
"ture establish a liability to a group which is apportioned among
qualifying individuals.2 30 A workers' compensation accrual esti-
mated on an aggregate basis presents the reverse situation. This
estimate starts with liability to an individual and then attempts to
estimate the liability to individuals using aggregate or group expe-
rience. Thus, using these cases to argue this liability to individuals
is not likely to be met with much success.
The Service often cites Mooney Aircraft2 3 1 for the proposition
that uncertainty of time of payment establishes that a fixed liabil-
ity does not exist.232 MooneyAircraft is distinguishable because it
involved payments which were not to begin until the aircraft was
retired. Payment pursuant to a workers' compensation claim be-
gins immediately and continues for as long as the statute requires.
229. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
231. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1970). See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Mooney Aircraft.
232. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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Despite the immediacy of the payment stream, the concurrence in
Lukens SteeP3 3 reasoned that the speculative nature of the future
commencement of payment was insufficient by itself to prevent
fixing of liability. Since payment starts immediately in a workers'
compensation claim, the Service's argument in Mooney is
undercut.
Another argument which a taxpayer may advance to establish
the propriety of an accrual for a workers' compensation claim is
that the accrual "clearly reflects income" for tax purposes.234 Ad-
ditionally, adherence to GAAP will be probative when the tax-
payer's financial reporting method does not interfere with tax
accounting objectives. Accrual for the estimated present value of a
claim, therefore, is in accordance with GAAP. Use of precise ac-
tuarial estimates for such an accrual will result in accurate match-
ing of revenues and expenses-the underlying objective of tax
accounting. Disallowance of the accrual would put the taxpayer
on an accrual basis for income generated through uncollected
sales revenues while placing the taxpayer on a cash basis for de-
ductibility of expenses associated with generation of this income.
The result is an obvious mismatching of revenues and expenses.
The Service further argues that despite the necessity of an ac-
crual, it cannot be allowed if its computational base is arbitrary,
insufficiently precise, or subject to variation. Such an accrual
would allow the taxpayer to unilaterally choose its tax liability.
Inconsistent and inequitable administration of the tax law would
result. The taxpayer may counterargue, however, that fixing of
payment dates and amounts by state law removes the arbitrariness
from the accrual. Precision is achieved by considering these pre-
determined amounts in light of the time value of money and revi-
sion due to actuarial changes in the life of the claim recipient. Use
of an independent claims administrator and an actuary serves to
objectify the estimates. The taxpayer may argue confidently that
its actuarial estimate based on these rigidly fixed payment sched-
ules makes an accrual precise and lacks arbitrariness. Revenues
are properly matched with expenses, tax accounting objectives are
not interferred with, and income is clearly reflected. Adherence to
(GAAP) is additional probative evidence that accrual is proper.
Active contest of facts fixing liability will lead to disallowance
233. 442 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1971). See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 112-52 and accompanying text.
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of the accrual. 235 This principle is well established, subject only to
the exception of section 461(f) of the Code allowing accrual of a
contested liability in limited circumstances.236
The final mode of analysis courts use to determine whether all
facts have occurred fixing liability is the examination of the dis-
tinction between conditions precedent and subsequent. 2 7 A con-
dition precedent prevents liability from emerging while a
condition subsequent diminishes, modifies, or terminates an ex-
isting liability. The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit agreed that employment-related injury was the only
condition precedent to liability under the Alaska and California
workers' compensation statutes. The exigencies of payment, such
as imprecise medical diagnoses, medical complications, and
changing life expectancies of beneficiaries are all conditions sub-
sequent which merely modify or terminate existing liability. The
injury fixes liability and changing conditions bear only on amount
and timing of payment.
2. Reasonableness of Amount
Once facts fixing liability have occurred, the second require-
ment of the all events test becomes applicable. The accrual must
be a reasonable estimate, but not precisely correct.238 The stan-
dards by which reasonableness is judged vary between the courts
and the Service.
The courts generally examine the method used to calculate the
estimate in determining its reasonableness. The Service, however,
generally posits that reasonableness requires fixed dates and
amounts for future payments. Taxpayers have argued success-
fully that fixed dates are not required and that statistics and the
law of large numbers may be used to calculate estimates for ac-
crual. An accrual for workers' compensation falls somewhere be-
tween these extremes. This accrual fulfills the Service's
requirements since amounts and dates of payment generally are
fixed by state statute and are dependent only on the nature of the
injury. The workers' compensation accrual is similar to the use of
purely statistical bases for accrual because it involves the use of
actuarial estimates to generate the present value of an individual
claim.
235. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 165-80 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 181-99 and accompanying text.
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The Service's position is founded on an outdated interpreta-
tion of the inflexible Brown v. Helvering"9 doctrine. The newer
and more flexible position espoused by the taxpayers in Crescent
Wha f and Wien is the better reasoned view. Use of statistical
estimates, group experience, and the law of large numbers should
be permissible when they are sufficiently precise, not arbitrary,
and do not result in undermining tax accounting objectives. The
essence of the reasonableness requirement, therefore, is actually
subsumed by that part of the all events test which permits an ac-
counting method for tax purposes which clearly reflects income.
Thus, when a taxpayer's semifixed estimate based on actuarial
techniques is found to be an accounting method which clearly re-
flects income, it follows a fortiori that the method will have been
calculated with sufficient reasonable precision to satisfy the sec-
ond part of the all events test.
V. CONCLUSION
Accrual of estimated amounts to be paid for claims under state
or federal workers' compensation laws for injuries occurring in the
current taxable year should be deductible under several theories.
The all events test is not an obstacle to accrual. The injury itself, if
uncontested as to occurrence within the scope of employment, is
an event which fixes a statutory obligation under the all events
test. Since payments generally begin immediately, remoteness in
time is not a problem. Where the taxpayer's accounting method
results in an accrual accurately matching revenues and expenses,
income clearly is reflected and tax accounting objectives are
preseved. The conditions precedent versus conditions subsequent
analysis also supports the proposition that injury fixes liability
under no-fault statutes and that existing contingencies, bearing
only on date and amount of payment, serve only to modify an
already existing liability. Lastly, where a taxpayer has established
that its accounting method and accrual clearly reflect income, it
will have established that the means used in calculation are
reasonable.
Taxpayers using an individual claim-by-claim analysis and
administering their claims using an independent claims adminis-
trator to calculate the accrual have a strong case. The case may be
strengthened if the claims administrator or taxpayer eliminates all
contested claims from the accrual calculation. There does appear
239. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
236 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:187
to be room, however, for a taxpayer to argue for inclusion of
claims contested on the basis of amount but not liability or for a
taxpayer to use an accrual estimation technique based on aggre-
gate statistical data or group experience if the conditions of clear
reflection of income can be independently satisfied.
RAYMOND M. MALONE
